Vanderbilt Law Review
Volume 31
Issue 4 Issue 4 - May 1978

Article 8

5-1978

A Comparative Review of Public and Private Enforcement of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
Robert Belton

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr
Part of the Civil Rights and Discrimination Commons, and the Labor and Employment Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Robert Belton, A Comparative Review of Public and Private Enforcement of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 31 Vanderbilt Law Review 905 (1978)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol31/iss4/8

This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted
for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more
information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.

A Comparative Review of Public and
Private Enforcement of Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964
Robert Belton*
TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.
II.

INTRODUCTION

................
....
EFFORTS To ELIMINATE EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION BEFORE TITLE VII: HISTORICAL

906

OVERVIEW ........................

908
908
912
914
916
918

A. Federal Efforts
...
B. State and Local Efforts
..........
C. Private Efforts .............
III. THE EMERGENCE OF TITLE VII
A. Statutory Enforcement Scheme
B.
IV.

Enforcement Models
.
......
To ENFORCE TITLE VII: THE FIRST DECADE

918
919

A. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
B. The Department of Justice ................
C. Private Efforts To Enforce Title VII
(1) Employment Discrimination Litigation
Strategy ..............
... .......

919
922
924

EFFORTS

V.

931

. . ..
CONCLUSIONS

952
961

RHETORIC

VI.

926

(2) Litigation Strategy and Development of the
Law ..............................
THE NEXT DECADE: A POTENT TOOL OR MELLIFLUOUS
.

......
.....

. .....
....

. . . ..
..

.

Congress gave private individuals a significant role in the enforcement process
of Title VII ... And although the 1972 amendment to Title VII empowers
the Commission to bring its own actions, the private right of action remains
an essential means of obtaining judicial enforcement of Title VII ....
In such
cases, the private litigant not only redresses his own injury but also vindicates
the important congressional policy against discriminatory employment practices.
* Associate Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University. B.A., University of Connecticut,
1961; J.D., Boston University, 1965. The author was associated with the NAACP Legal
Defense Fund as a staff attorney with responsibility for Title VII litigation strategies. The
views expressed are those of the author and not those of the Legal Defense Fund.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 31:905

In the Civil Rights Act of 1964,. . . Congress indicated that it considered the
policy against discrimination to be of the "highest priority.",
I.

INTRODUCTION

On March 8, 1971, the United States Supreme Court decided
Griggs v. Duke Power Company,2 its first major decision interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VII, as amended
in 1972, prohibits employment discrimination in the public and
private sectors on the basis of race, sex, national origin, or religion. 3
Griggs enunciated a statutory concept of discrimination based on
the "consequences" or "adverse effects" that an employment practice has on the employment opportunities of those protected by the
Act. The Griggs concept has been described as "disparate impact,"
"adverse impact," "disproportionate impact," or "statistical discrimination." Griggs not only established the doctrinal foundation
for the contemporary development of employment discrimination
law,4 but also provided the doctrinal framework for a transition from
the human relations/administrative enforcement model to the public law enforcement model.
Prior to Title VII, federal and state agencies had essentially
preemptive roles in the enforcement of fair employment practices
laws, and opportunity for private participation was almost nonexistent. A person claiming to be aggrieved by a prohibited practice
could initiate the enforcement process by filing a complaint, but
once the process was initiated, the aggrieved person usually had no
further meaningful participation. In some jurisdictions the complainant could not seek administrative or judicial review if the enforcement agency dismissed his claim, nor could he invoke the public hearing procedure included in many of the earlier laws.'
1. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 45, 47 (1974).
2. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-15 (1970), as amended by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to
2000e-17 (Supp. V 1975)) [Hereinafter all references to Title VII will be cited only to the
United States Code].
4. Terms such as "fair employment practices," "equal employment opportunity laws,"
and "employment discrimination law," have been used interchangeably to describe the body
of law that has developed in the wake of Title VII. Because the term "fair employment
practices" is so closely identified with pre-Title VII enforcement efforts to remedy employment discrimination, and because the post-Title VII enforcement efforts appear to differ, the
term "employment discrimination law" is more appropriate to describe the post-Title VII
developments.
5. See generally Hill, Twenty Years of State FairEmployment Practice Commissions:
A CriticalAnalysiswith Recommendations, 14 BuFFALo L. Rav. 22 (1964); Witherspoon, Civil
Rights Policy in the Federal System: Proposalsfor a Better Use of Administrative Process,
74 YALE L.J. 1171 (1965).
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Title VII provided the first meaningful opportunity for private
participation in the enforcement process of the national policy
against employment discrimination. Although the enactment of
Title VII culminated a twenty-year campaign by civil rights advocates for a clear enunciation and implementation of a national policy against employment discrimination,' the civil rights demonstrations of the early 1960's provided the immediate impetus for legislative and executive action.7 The prevailing attitude toward Title VII,
as finally enacted, was that the civil rights movement had suffered
a defeat-prompted by the political reality of compromise, Congress
had deprived the primary federal enforcement agency, the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, of cease and desist power,
the centerpiece for effective enforcement.' Congress substituted
three enforcement processes for cease and desist power: administrative enforcement by the EEOC, "pattern or practice" civil litigation by the Attorney General,"0 and private civil actions by aggrieved persons-the "private attorney general."" The Act afforded
to those responsible for each enforcement process the unique opportunity to develop the law on employment discrimination, because a
major shortcoming of earlier efforts to eliminate employment discrimination was the failure to develop a coherent body of law, a sine
qua non for effective implementation.
During the first decade of Title VII's enforcement, the development in the law of employment discrimination was explosive, 2 a
development that is perhaps unparalleled in the whole of civil rights
enforcement. Although Title VII has not brought Nirvana or Arma6. See Vaas, Title VII: Legislative History, 7 B.C. INDus. & COM. L. Rav. 431, 431 n.2
(1966).
7.

See Schlei, Forewordto B. SCHLE! & P. GROSSMAN, EMPLoYmErr DISCRIMINATION LAW

(1976).
8. See A. BLUMROSEN, BLACK EMPLOYMENT

AND THE

LAW 57-58 (1971); Berg, Equal Em-

ployment Opportunity Under the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 31 BROOKLYN L. REv. 62 (1965).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1970).
10. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(a) (1970). Responsibility for pattern or practice civil litigation
against private defendants was transferred from the Attorney General to the EEOC by a 1972
amendment to Title VII. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(c) (Supp. V 1975). This transfer became effective two years later. The Attorney General still has sole authority under Title VII to sue state
and local governments. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. V 1975). See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422
U.S. 405, 415 (1975) (applying the notion of a "private attorney general" to private plaintiffs
in Title VII cases).
12. For a detailed review of the procedural and substantive developments of the law
under Title VII, see Belton, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A Decade of Private
Enforcement and JudicialDevelopments, 20 ST. Louis U.L.J. 225 (1976); Developments in
the Law-Employment Discriminationand Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HAnv.
L. REv. 1109 (1971).
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geddon,'3 foundations have been established for the orderly progression from administrative procedure, through the definition and
proof of discrimination, and ultimately to the fashioning of appropriate remedies. The efforts of the EEOC, the Department of Justice, and other federal and state agencies during the first decade of
enforcement have been the subject of a great deal of commentary
and review. Much of this commentary has been critical. 4 Private
enforcement of Title VII has produced the major legal developments, but these efforts have received little attention in the literature. This Article therefore will present a comparative review of
governmental and private enforcement efforts under Title VII. A
brief overview of the historical efforts to eliminate employment discrimination prior to Title VII is necessary to place private enforcement efforts in proper perspective. It is not the purpose of this
Article to*review the development of the substantive law during the
first decade of Title VII; this has been covered elsewhere. 5 The
beginning of the second decade of Title VII's enforcement has produced new issues, such as "reverse discrimination" and "quotas,"
whose resolution may determine whether the legal principles of
employment discrimination law that developed during the first decade will remain a potent tool for the elimination of employment
discrimination, or whether it will be reduced to "mellifluous but
hollow rhetoric."' 6 The more important of these evolving issues will
be discussed.
II.

EFFORTS

To ELIMINATE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION BEFORE
TITLE VII: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW

A. FederalEfforts
The evil that Title VII is designed to remedy-employment
discrimination-is a well-documented historical, economic, and
social fact. Although employment discrimination has existed
throughout American history,' 7 the federal government did not join
13. See Rodino, Preface to the First Decade of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act: Past
Developments and Future Trends, 20 ST. Louis U.L.J. 222 (1976).
14. See, e.g., U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL PIHTS, THE FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT
EFFORT: To ELIMINATE EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 18-132 (1971) [hereinafter cited as 1971
FEDERAL EFFORT].

. 15. See, e.g., Belton, supra note 12; Jones, The Development of the Law Under Title

VII Since 1965: Implications of the New Law, 30 RUTGERS L. REv. 1 (1976).
16. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225, 1237-38 (4th Cir. 1970) (Sobeloff, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part).
17. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 1370, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 2155-56 (1962), reprinted in
EEOC, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (1970); Edwards, Race Discriminationin Employment: What Price Equality?, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 572.
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even symbolically the concern of black civil rights advocates and
their supporters over employment discrimination until President
Roosevelt, on June 25, 1941, issued Executive Order 8802,' 8 which
prohibited discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin,
or religion by federal defense agencies and private corporations performing defense work under contracts with the federal government.
The purpose of Executive Order 8802 was to "reaffirm the policy of
the United States that there shall be no discrimination in the employment of workers in defense industries or government because of
race, creed, color, or national origin ...
."' But the circumstances
under which President Roosevelt issued Executive Order 8802 parallel the circumstances under which Congress enacted the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.0
It was not the hopes of minorities that brought relief, nor even the horrors
of racism elsewhere in the world, although the President was surely moved by
them. The disquieting reality is that President Roosevelt was embarrassed into
acting by the threat of a demonstration march on Washington. Scheduled for
July 1, 1941, the march seemed likely to attract 100,000 Negroes to the capitol
to protest against the substantial exclusion of Negroes from employment in
government and defense industries. The Administration exerted itself to have
the march called off. Letters were written and conferences held, but without
the President's firm commitment to use his powers to obtain equal employment opportunity, the Negro leaders held fast. Finally, on June 25, the President capitulated and promulgated Executive Order 8802 .... 1"

Executive Order 8802 established a five-person Fair Employment
Practices Committee (FEPC) to administer the Order's policy of
equal employment in defense contracts awarded by the federal government and in vocational and training programs administered by
federal agencies. The first FEPC suspended its operations in 1943,
2 with broader
and a new FEPC1
jurisdiction was established. The
Committee processed about 8000 complaints of employment dis18. 3 C.F.R. 957 (1938-1943 Compilation).

19, Id. (emphasis added). It seems ironic that the order sought to "reaffirm" a policy
that evidently did not exist. See U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, EMPLOYMENT 6 (1961)
[hereinafter cited as 1961 EMPLOYMENT REPORT].
20. See text accompanying notes 54-57 infra. For a summary of conditions leading to
the establishment of the first Federal Fair Employment Practice Committee, see L. RucHAMEs, RACE, JOBS & POLITICS 11-21 (1953).
21. M. SOVERN, LEGAL RESTRAINTS ON RAcIAL DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT 9 (1966).

See H.

GARFINKEL, WHEN NEGROES MARCH: THE MARCH ON WASHINGTON MOVEMENT IN THE

ORGANIZATIONAL POLITICS FOR FEPC (1959) (history of the march on Washington).

22.

On May 27, 1943, less than two years after the first FEPC was established, President

Roosevelt issued a second order, Exec. Order No. 9346, 3 C.F.R. 1280 (1938-1943 Compilation). This order reorganized the FEPC and expanded its jurisdiction to "all employers,
including the several Federal departments and agencies, and all labor organizations ... to
eliminate discrimination in regard to hire, tenure, terms or conditions of employment, or

union membership because of race, creed, color, or national origin." Id.
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crimination under a weak mandate to "take appropriate steps to
obtain elimination of . . . discrimination [forbidden by this
Order]." 23 It was recognized at this early date that employment
discrimination presented complex structural and remedial problems
but no sanctions were specified. 24
In 1944 Congress adopted the Russell amendment, 25 which provided that any agency created by executive order and in existence
for more than one year could receive federal funds only if Congress
specifically appropriated funds for the agency. As a result of this
amendment and fear that Congress would not appropriate funds for
the Committee's continued existence, the FEPC was allowed to die
26
a quiet death.
From 1946 until 1964, the principal federal effort to eliminate
employment discrimination was in the area of government contracts. Presidents Truman and Eisenhower established Committees
on Government Contract Compliance. 2 Neither of these committees, however, had direct enforcement power, and studies of these
programs conclude that their impact on the elimination of job discrimination was minimal. 2 Other efforts under the FEPC model
during the period 1941-1961 have received mixed reviews, but the
consensus is that the FEPC approach proved to be incapable of
coping with the complex problems of employment discrimination.
In 1961 through Executive Order 10,925,29 President Kennedy
created the President's Committee on Equal Employment Opportunity. In October 1965 this order was superseded by President
Johnson's Executive Order 11,246. 31 The Johnson order effected an
administrative reorganization abolishing the President's Committee
23. Id. The FEPC had the authority to receive and investigate complaints of discrimination, to hold public hearings, to make findings of fact, and to take appropriate steps to
eliminate discrimination. Two reports of its activities were issued. FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICE
COMMITrEE, FIRST REPORT (1945), FINAL REPORT (1947). The FEPC received 4081 complaints

during its first fiscal year, of which 3198, or 80.8 percent, alleged racial discrimination. FAIR
EMPLOYMENT PRACTICE COMMITTEE, FIRST REPORT 37 (1945).

24. See generally Witherspoon, supra note 5.
25. Independent Offices Appropriation Act, 1945, Pub. L. No. 358, § 213, 58 Stat. 361
(1944) (current version at 31 U.S.C. § 696 (1970)).
26. See SOVERN, supra note 21, at 15.
27. See 1961 EMPLOYMENT REPORT, supra note 19, at 12-16.
28. See, e.g., H. HILL, BLACK LABOR AND THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 173-84 (1977);
SOVERN, supranote 21, at 9-17; Jenkins, A Study of FederalEffort to EndJob Bias: A History,
A Status Report, and a Prognosis, 14 How. L.J. 259, 269-74 (1968).
29. 3 C.F.R. 448 (1959-1963 Compilation). This order revived the federal effort to remedy employment discrimination. See 1961 EMPLOYMENT REPORT, supra note 19, at 16-17.
30. 3 C.F.R. 339 (1964-1965 Compilation). This 1965 Executive Order did not include
a prohibition against sex discrimination in employment. This omission was corrected by
Executive Order 11,478, 3 C.F.R. 133 (1969 Compilation).
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and assigning its responsibility and jurisdiction over government
contractors to the Department of Labor. These orders led to the
creation of the Office of Federal Contract Compliance (OFCC)
within the Department of Labor. OFCC was given primary responsibility for the administration and enforcement of Executive Order
11,246. The order prohibits employment discrimination on the
basis of race, color, religion, or national origin by firms that contract
with the government. It requires federal contractors to take affirmative action to insure that employees are treated in accordance with
the broad mandate. Sanctions for violation of this order include
debarment from future government contracts.3 1 These sanctions,
however, never have been used effectively to remedy employment
32
discrimination.
The first federal legislation to remedy employment discrimination was introduced in Congress in 1943, during the existence of the
first FEPC. A number of other bills, including Senator Taft's bill
proposing to reduce discrimination through voluntary efforts and
the Dawson-Scanlon bill proposing to establish an agency with di3
rect enforcement powers, were introduced between 1943-1963.1
Before Title VII, the National Labor Relations Act 34 and the
Railway Labor Act 35 were the only federal legislation that afforded
an opportunity for judicial redress of employment discrimination
claims. These congressional enactments were designed to regulate
the relations between employers and unions, not to provide a remedy for employment discrimination. Nevertheless, they have afforded some protection against employment discrimination when a
collective bargaining relationship exists between an employer and
a union. The most significant protection against employment discrimination under these acts has been the duty of fair representation, largely a creature of the federal judiciary and private efforts.
3" a case arising under
In Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad,
the Railway Labor Act, black railway firemen challenged a collective bargaining agreement that conditioned seniority on race. Creating the duty of fair representation, the Court held that a majority
union, acting as the collective bargaining agent under federal law,
31.

See SOVERN, supra note 21, at 103-42.

32.

U.S. COMMISSION ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT-A

REASSESSMENT 74 (1973).
33. See EEOC, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF ITLES VII AND XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964,

at 7-11 (1970).
34.
35.
36.
Relations

29 U.S.C. §§ 151-168 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
45 U.S.C. §§ 151-162 (1970).
323 U.S. 192 (1944). In a companion case the Court interpreted the National Labor
Act to require a similar duty. Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248 (1944).
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may not enter into contracts that discriminate against black workers because the law imposes upon the statutory representative a
duty to protect equally the interests of all members of a craft at least
as exacting as the duty that the constitution imposes upon legisla31
tures to provide equal protection to those for whom it legislates.
Subsequent decisions have extended the implications of the Steele
doctrine.
Although the duty of fair representation is not explicit in the
National Labor Relations Act, the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB) with its extensive administrative resources could have applied the Steele doctrine against overt discriminatory practices of
employers and labor unions. 8 For many years, however, the Board
remained unresponsive to complaints of race and sex discrimination. One commentator has characterized the history of the NLRB's
policy toward employment discrimination as "the slow transformation of a vague public policy into a judicially developed body of law
reluctantly enforced by an administrative agency. '39 The NLRB's
attitude apparently was consistent with the attitude of the executive and legislative branches during 1941-1961. The Steele duty of
fair representation developed not as a result of federal initiative; its
development instead is a legal brainchild of private civil rights litigation activities."
B.

State and Local Efforts

In the 1940's states and municipalities began enacting measures to remedy employment discrimination. Before 1963 twenty
state and local governments had established human relations commissions or fair employment commissions for this purpose. In 1963
and 1964 local pressure prompted an additional two hundred communities and several additional states to enact similar measures.4'
37. So long as a labor union, assumes to act as the statutory representative of a
craft, it cannot rightly refuse to perform the duty, which is inseparable from the power
of representation conferred upon it, to represent the entire membership of the craft.
While the statute does not deny to such a bargaining labor organization the right to
determine eligibility to its membership, it does require the union, in collective bargaining and in making contracts with the carrier to represent non-union or minority union
members of the craft without hostile discrimination, fairly, impartially, and in good
faith.
323 U.S. at 204. See SovERN, supranote 21, at 143-75.
38. See HILL, supra note 28, at 93-169; Axelrod & Kaufman, Manion HouseBekins-Handy Andy: The National Labor Relations Board's Role in Racial Discrimination
Cases, 45 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 675 (1977).
39. Id. at 93.
40. See R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 233-34 (1975).
41. See Witherspoon, supra note 5, at 1173. For an excellent list of state and local
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The statutes and ordinances created agencies with powers ranging
from the power only to conciliate to full cease and desist power. A
1961 study summarized these statutes and ordinances:
They declare discrimination in public and private employment on racial, religious, or ethnic grounds to be illegal; they authorize a state administrative
agency to receive and investigate complaints; they empower the agency to
eliminate, by persuasion and mediation, any discrimination found to exist; if
unsuccessful in such efforts, the agency is authorized to proceed by public
hearing, findings of fact and law, and cease and desist orders, which are enforceable by court decree; judicial review is available to a person claiming to
be aggrieved by an agency ruling; and finally, the state agency is responsible
for an educational program intended to reduce and eliminate discrimination
and prejudice. 2

States with such provisions had the authority to undertake more
forceful roles in eliminating employment discrimination, but like
their federal counterpart, they did not use that authority effectively.
Because state agencies failed to develop a coherent concept of
"discrimination" and relied upon what may be called the human
relations/administrative enforcement model, their records of accomplishments are bleak."
Doctrinally, the human relations/administrative model views
discrimination as a moral rather than a legal wrong. Thus, under
this model legal coercion is considered inappropriate even when
judicial enforcement authority is provided." State agencies adopted
the human relations/administrative enforcement model even
though philosophical differences existed among the persons and organizations that established and staffed fair employment practice
human relations commissions, including their areas of competency, citations to their enabling
legislation, and statistics concerning their activities, see the appendix to Witherspoon's article.
42. M. KoNvrrz & T. LESKES, A CENTURY OF CIVIL RIGHTS 203 (1961).
43. The Federal Fair Employment Practice Committee developed the following guidelines to determine the validity of a complaint: facts showing that it was the policy or practice
of an employer to hire members of a minority group as laborers or custodial workers without
regard to qualification; recruiting a substantial group of skilled workers from a technical
school that blacks and Jews attended, but hiring no blacks and only a small number of Jews;
placing racial or religious limitations in job advertisements; discharging an employee for
failing to salute the flag because of religious conviction; requiring black applicants to obtain
a permit from a union known to discriminate; and quota hiring to restrict the number of
blacks in the work force. The mere fact that an employer had no blacks or only a small
number in its employment was insufficient for a finding of discrimination unless coupled with
two other conditions: the plant guard turned black applicants away, and the employer contended that certain skills were concentrated in certain nationalities. FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICE COMMITEE, FrsT REPORT, supra note 23, at 55-57.
44. A Study by the Senate Committee on Labor showed that of the more than 19,000
complaints that had been filed in thirteen states before December 31, 1961, there had been
only eighteen court actions. See 110 CONG. RPc. 7207 (1964).
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commissions. The following observation demonstrates this philosophical conflict:
[Tihe [dominant] groups were doctrinally committed to human relations
rather than civil rights. The distinction is that the human rights organizations
define the problem only in class terms and look to moral suasion, drawing their
support and inspiration from natural law and theology but tending to overlook
the instruments of the states, except insofar as they might be made to affirm
such principals [sic] rhetorically. The civil rights organizations on the contrary look primarily to law, courts and statecraft as the primary instruments
of progress-and this not only to pronounce but to deliver and protect the
rights of the individual as well as the rights of a class.
In spite of the leadership of a militant socialist, A. Phillip Randolph, the
human rights organizations maintained the balance of power in the effort to
forge a permanent statutory FEPC. Accordingly, their propaganda and proposals were drawn in the moralistic language of their YMCA type membership.
They believed in education, dialogue, reconciliation and conciliation as the
5
methods for resolving the basic problem of employment bias.

The informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion
were to be conducted in private, without the threat of sanctions and
without objective standards for compliance."
C. Private Efforts
Prior to Title VII, few opportunities were open for private enforcement of employment discrimination laws. The available opportunities were manifestly limited and uncertain. No right of private
enforcement existed under the federal fair employment practice
orders and regulations beyond the opportunity to file a complaint.
If the complaint were dismissed, or if the complaint were valid but
efforts to conciliate failed, no further private recourse was available.4 7 Some state laws provided aggrieved individuals the oppor45.

Jenkins, supra note 28, at 270. See generally L.

KESSELMAN,

THE SOCIAL POLITICS OF

FEPC (1948).
46. Settlement by moral suasion in many cases did not result in a compulsory order
for the employer who violated the law to hire, promote, or reimburse for back pay. Many
commissioners did not feel compelled to demand such relief because they considered their
main function to be the promotion of the educational message, rather than the settlement of
complaints- by enforcement of the laws. See, e.g., Hearings on S. 773, S. 1210, and S. 1937
Before the Subcomm. on Employment and Manpower of the Senate Comm. on Labor and
Public Welfare, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 228-29 (1963), when an official of the California commission testified that he was more concerned with attainment of a proper educational environment than with the full use of the commission's powers to secure new jobs for complainants.
Similar testimony was offered by an official from the Missouri commission. Id. at 240. In Hill,
supra note 5, at 38, the author states, "It is evident that state commissions are much too
concerned with avoiding hostility from businessmen, too careful to refrain from interfering
with the stability of manufacturing enterprise or union power, and insufficiently concerned
with the welfare of the Negro job seeker."
47. See 1961 EMPLOYMENT REPORT, supra note 19, at 10-11; see also Annot., 31 A.L.R.
FED. 108 (1977) (discussing the right of private action for employment discrimination through

the OFCC pursuant to Executive Order 11,246).
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tunity to seek judicial review of adverse commission actions, but the
chances of obtaining a favorable judicial ruling were slim.4 8 Federal
and state courts normally gave considerable weight to administrative determinations, presuming them to be correct unless clearly
persuaded that the determinations were not supported by substantial evidence. 4 Some private litigation to remedy employment discrimination in federal, state, and local governments was conducted
under the fifth and fourteenth amendments.50
Costs, litigation expenses, and attorneys fees were major factors
imposing a general limitation: 51 precisely because of employment
discrimination, the victims of discrimination did not have the resources to finance the costs of litigation. 52 Another limiting factor
was that civil rights cases, particularly ones involving race, occupied
high priority on the list of unpopular cases among attorneys. 3 Thus,
even assuming that costs were not a barrier, the probability for
hiring an attorney who was willing to represent a black victim of
employment discrimination was severely limited. The school deseg48.

SOVERN, supra note 21, at 24.

49. In Draper v. Clark Dairy, Inc., 17 Conn. Supp. 93 (Super. Ct. 1950), the court
established the rule that findings of fact of the commission are binding on the court unless
the record shows that the commission acted arbitrarily or capriciously. Id. at 96-97. This case
reviewed most of the present rules applicable to judicial review of FEP commission actions.
See also Jeanpierre v. Arbury, 4 N.Y.2d 238, 149 N.E.2d 882, 173 N.Y.S.2d 597 (1958);
Holland v. Edwards, 307 N.Y. 38, 119 N.E.2d 581 (1954).
50. See, e.g., J. GREENBERG, RACE RELA7rONS AND AMERICAN LAw 154-207 (1959). A leading Supreme Court case involving aliens, Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915), held that
requiring an employer's work force to comprise at least eighty percent qualified electors or
natural born citizens denied aliens equal protection of the law. This case was relied upon to
make some inroads against employment discrimination in state employment.
51. Civil rights litigation is costly. It has been estimated that a suit involving a trial in
a district court, an appeal to a circuit court, and a petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court
costs between $15,000 and $18,000. 110 CONG. REc. 6541 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey in the debate over Title VII). Litigation in Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294
(1955), cost over $200,000. Id. In Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), the district
court awarded plaintiffs over $65,000 in costs, expenses, and attorneys fees.
52. William H. Brown, III, EEOC Chairman from 1969 to 1973, testified before a congressional committee that
the disadvantaged individual is told that in the pinch he must become a litigant, which
is an expensive proposition and traditionally the prerogative of the rich. Thus minorities
are locked out of the proffered remedy by the very condition that led to its creation, and
the credibility of the Government's guarantees is accordingly diminished.
Equal Employment OpportunitiesEnforcement Procedures:Hearings on H.R. 6228 and H.R.
13517 Before the Gen. Subcomm. on Labor of the House Comm. on Education and Labor,
91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 34 (1969-1970).
53. "Lawsuits attacking racial discrimination .
are neither very profitable nor very
popular. They are not an object of general competition among. . . lawyers; the problem is
rather one of an apparent dearth of lawyers who are willing to undertake such litigation."
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 443 (1963) (footnote omitted), quoted in Sanders v. Russell,
401 F.2d 241, 245 (5th Cir. 1968).
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regation campaign consumed many of the resources available to
private enforcement efforts; consequently few resources were available for similar campaigns with other laws.
On June 25, 1941, President Roosevelt issued Executive Order
8802. On July 2, 1965, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
became effective. During the twenty-four years between the presidential executive order and Title VII, an imposing arsenal consisting of the federal Fair Employment Practice Commission, state and
local fair employment practice commissions, federal statutory law,
federal decisional law, and to a more limited extent, private litigation was employed to remedy employment discrimination. The
overwhelming majority of those who have studied the record of the
pre-Title VII efforts to eliminate employment discrimination have
concluded that the efforts were ineffective. These earlier efforts can
be characterized only as bandaid and cosmetic. The principal reason for ineffective enforcement was the federal government's failure
to enunciate and implement a national policy against employment
discrimination. The time for such a policy was long overdue when
Title VII became law.
III.

THE EMERGENCE OF TITLE VII

By 1963 the pressure for strong civil rights legislation was building. All of America was alarmed. Americans saw on their-television
screens civil rights activists beaten and dragged through the streets.
They saw the suppression of nonviolent demonstrators asking only
for service in a restaurant or a seat on a bus. The campaign for
equality resulted in hundreds of civil rights demonstrations across
the nation in 1963.11 The demands of the oppressed had awakened
many white Americans to a new sense of responsibility to correct the
result of two centuries of blatant inequality.
On June 11, 1963, President Kennedy on national television
said that it ought to be possible "for every American to enjoy the
privilege of being American without regard to his race or color ....
It is better to settle these matters in the courts than on the streets,
and new laws are needed at every level." 55 Eight days later, on June
19, 1963, he sent a civil rights bill to Congress. The Administration's
bill dealt with discrimination in employment, voting, public accommodations, education, and federally assisted programs. As finally
enacted, Title VII bore no resemblence to the bill submitted by the
5
Kennedy Administration. 1
54.
55.
56.

See CIVIL RIGHTS, 1960-66 at 168-230 (A. Soble ed. 1967).
N.Y. Times, June 12, 1963, at 1, col. 5 (emphasis added).
Schlei, supra note 7, at viii-xiii.
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On August 28, 1963, 250,000 people gathered beneath the
Washington Monument to hear Dr. Martin Luther King's "I Have
a Dream" speech. On November 22, 1963, President Kennedy was
killed. Soon after President Kennedy's death, President Johnson
met with civil rights leaders to assure them that he would press
vigorously for the civil rights bill. By that time the civil rights bill
that President Kennedy had sent to Congress had gone to the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives. The committee
chairman, Emmanual Celler, a seventy-six year-old liberal Democrat, for years had fought for constitutional and civil liberties by
introducing civil rights bills in Congress in 1949, 1957, and 1960.
After extensive committee hearings, the omnibus civil rights bill
was reported out with bipartisan support. A coalition of seventynine civil rights and labor organizations, known as the Leadership
Conference on Civil Rights, joined together to lobby for the bill. The
coalition urged that the proposed Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission be given power to order employers to cease and desist
from discriminatory employment practices, a power already held by
the National Labor Relations Board. At the very least, the civil
rights advocates insisted that the Commission be given the right to
file suit in federal court against recalcitrant employers. In the end,
however, the EEOC was given only informal powers of conference,
conciliation, and persuasion. This meant that if the EEOC was
unable to conciliate a claim of employment discrimination, the individual complainant or the Department of Justice, not the EEOC,
had to take the matter to court.
The House adopted a number of amendments. A sex discrimination amendment, the most important one, was introduced by
Congressman Smith of Virginia as a joke in an attempt to defeat the
bill. The bill, including the sex discrimination amendment, passed
in the House of Representatives on February 10, 1964. The bill then
went to the Senate where a Southern block began a filibuster to
defeat the bill. Five hundred amendments, 534 hours, one minute,
and 37 seconds after the filibuster began, the Senate voted cloture.
The bill passed the Senate on June 17, 1964, by a vote of 76 to 18.
On July 2, 1964, one hour after debate, the House of Representatives
passed the Senate version of the bill by a vote of 289 to 126.11 At
seven o'clock that evening, President Johnson signed the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 in the East Room of the White House.
57. See EEOC, LEGIsLATIvE
at 11 (1970).
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Statutory Enforcement Scheme

When Title VII was passed, it was expected that the major
responsibility for enforcement would rest with the EEOC and the
Department of Justice. The role of private enforcement was expected to be minimal, with focus on the individual claims of discrimination; pattern, practice, or systemic discrimination would be
handled by the federal enforcement agencies. The statutory scheme
for private enforcement of Title VII requires the aggrieved person to
file a charge with the EEOC. The charge must be filed within a
specified time after the occurrence of the alleged unlawful practice. 8
The EEOC is required to conduct an investigation to determine
whether reasonable cause exists to believe that a violation of the Act
has occurred. If reasonable cause is found, the EEOC is directed to
attempt to eliminate the violation through informal methods of conciliation. 9 If conciliation efforts fail, the EEOC must notify the
charging party and inform him of his right to seek judicial enforcement of his claim.'" The Department of Justice may seek direct
judicial enforcement without regard to the EEOC procedures.,,
B.

Enforcement Models

The Title VII enforcement scheme includes both the human
relations/administrative model and the traditional judicial enforcement model. The human relations/administrative model is set out
in section 706(b), which provides that if, after an investigation, the
EEOC finds reasonable cause to believe the Act has been violated,
the agency "shall endeavor to eliminate any such alleged unlawful
employment practice by informal methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion."6 The "reasonable cause" standard applicable to the EEOC administrative process differs from the
"intentional" discrimination standard that governs proceedings
6 3
under the judicial model.
The judicial enforcement model is found in two different sections of Title VII. Section 707 gave the Department of Justice the
authority to bring "pattern or practice" civil action against employers. A pattern or practice of discrimination consists of the denial of
rights in "something more than an isolated, sporadic incident.""
58. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. V 1975).
60. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (1970 & Supp. V 1975).
62. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. V 1975).
63. See text accompanying notes 64-68 infra.
64. 110 CONG. REC. 14,270 (1964) (remarks of Senator Humphrey), quoted in International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 n.16 (1977).
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The authority for private civil actions is found in section 706(f) (1).11
The 1972 amendments to Title VII empowered the EEOC to seek
temporary relief in cases when a preliminary investigation affords a
basis for prompt judicial action;" only the Attorney General has the
authority to bring Title VII actions against state and local governmental units. " According to section 706(g), judicial relief may be
granted only "if the respondent has intentionally engaged in or is
intentionally engaging in an unlawful employment practice charged
in the complaint."" Jurisdiction over Title VII civil actions is vested
in the federal district courts.
Chayes has described employment discrimination litigation as
one of the "avatars" of the emerging model of public law litigation.
He describes the characteristics of this model as follows:
The party structure is sprawling and amorphous, subject to change over the
course of the litigation. The traditional adversary relationship is suffused and
intermixed with negotiating and mediating processes at every point. The judge
is the dominant figure in organizing and guiding the case, he draws for support
not only on the parties and their counsel, but on a wide range of outsiders-masters, experts, and oversight personnel. Most important, the trial
judge has increasingly become the creator and manager of complex forms of
ongoing relief, which have widespread effects on persons not before the court
and require the judge's continuing involvement in administration and implementation."

Many of the Title VII class actions have these characteristics, which
provide private litigants the opportunity to pursue judicial enforce-

ment that is functionally equivalent to the "pattern or practice"
authority of the Department of Justice and the EEOC. 0
IV.

EFFORTS To ENFORCE TITLE VII: THE FIRST DECADE

A.

The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Title VII was enacted into law on July 2, 1964, but its effective
date was delayed one year to provide potential defendants, such as
65. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
66. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(2) (Supp. V 1975).
67. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. V 1975), 2000e-6(a) (1970).
68. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. V 1975).
69. Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation,89 HARv. L. REv. 1281, 1284
(1976).
70. See, e.g., Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 34 (5th Cir. 1968). In reversing
the dismissal of a Title VII class action because plaintiff had received a previously denied

promotion, the court noted:
Indeed, if class-wide relief were not afforded expressly in any injunction or declaratory order issued in Employee's behalf, the result would be the incongruous one of the
Court-a Federal Court, no less-itself being the instrument of racial discrimination,
which brings to mind our rejection of like arguments and result in Potts v. Flax, 5 Cir.,
1963, 313 F.2d 284, 289.
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employers, labor unions, and employment agencies, an opportunity
to undertake voluntary compliance measures. This grace period also
was intended to give the EEOC an opportunity to organize, to employ a staff, and to establish procedures for its operation. A 1971
study of the federal civil rights enforcement effort reported that the
EEOC completely failed to take advantage of this opportunity:
Since its inception, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has
been plagued by organizational and personnel problems which have impaired
its ability to operate at maximum effectiveness. The agency opened its doors
on July 2, 1965, under inauspicious circumstances. Since the implementing
provisions of Title VII, passed on July 2, 1964, were not to become effective
until 1 year later, it was anticipated that the interim year would be used to
organize and staff the new agency and to establish procedures for its operation.
President Johnson, however, did not appoint a Chairman and Commissioners
until May 10, 1965. Sworn in on June 1, 1965, they had only a month to make
the Commission operational. Consequently, on the date Title VII became
effective, EEOC had only a skeletal organization and staff and no operational
procedures."

The report noted that the structural deficiencies were compounded
by acute staffing problems, high turnover rates, and insufficient
personnel. The study concluded that these structural and staffing
deficiencies caused the Commission to suffer from a critical lack of
continuity and direction, thereby impairing its ability to operate
2
efficiently and to fulfill its Title VII mandate.
The language and legislative history of Title VII suggest that
the EEOC should complete the administrative process on a charge
within thirty days with certain deferral periods for state and local
agency actions. During the early years of its operation, the EEOC
attempted to process charges within the statutory time periods. 3
The period for the administrative processing of charges, however,
has increased steadily since the EEOC began operation. A study
71. 1971 FEDERAL EFFORT, supra note 14, at 87-88. On September 28, 1976, in a report
to the Congress, the Comptroller General concluded that the EEOC, although having some
success in its enforcement efforts, a decade after the effective date of Title VII, did not appear

to have made enough advances against employment discrimination to have made a real
difference. COMPTROLLER GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: THE
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION HAS MADE LIMITED PROGRESS IN ELIMINATING
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION, H.R. Doc. No. 147, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. (1976) [hereinafter
cited as COMPTROLLER REPORT].
72. 1971 FEDERAL EFFORT, supra note 14, at 88.

73. See, e.g., Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 1 Empl. Prac. Dec. 9782 (E.D. Va. 1967).
Charges were filed in September 1965. A right to sue letter was sent in November 1965 stating:
Since your case was presented to the Commission in the early months of the administration of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Commission was unable to
undertake extensive conciliation activities. Additional conciliation efforts will be continued by the Commission.
Id. at 747.
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issued by the Comptroller General reported that some charging parties now have to wait about two years for their complaints to be
resolved by the EEOC. Some charges have remained in the backlog
74
for as long as seven years.
The EEOC expected no more than 2000 charges to be filed
during its first year of operation, and its initial budget of 3.25 million dollars and staffing requirements had been geared to that expectation. The agency, however, received 8854 charges during its
first fiscal year, most of which were claims of race discrimination.
The number of charges steadily increased in subsequent years from
12,148 in 1969 to 71,023 in 1975.15 The substantial backlog of cases
has decreased the effectiveness of the EEOC since its first year of
operation.
In March 1966, within the first year of the effective date of Title
VII, the EEOC, the Department of Labor, and the Department of
Justice combined their efforts to negotiate the settlement of an
employment discrimination complaint against the Newport News
Shipbuilding and Drydock Company in Newport News, Virginia. 6
The settlement was achieved without invoking the full administrative or judicial processes. New theories and enforcement techniques
were utilized for the first and only time in the history of federal
efforts to eliminate employment discrimination. The human
rights/administrative approach and notions of group wrong were
rejected. Reliance instead was placed upon an official written decision finding reasonable cause.77 The negotiations proceeded on the
theory that individuals and groups have a right to be free from
discrimination. Although the seeds for innovative enforcement techniques were planted in this settlement, they never have been nur7
tured. 1
The EEOC made some significant contributions to the enforcement effort during the Act's first decade. Perhaps its major contribution has been the publication of guidelines and interpretations of
the substantive provisions of Title VII. 7 In many instances courts
74.
75.

COMPTROLLER REPORT, supra note 71, at 8.

1 EEOC ANN. REP. 14-15 (1966). COMP'rROUER REPORT, supra note 71, at 3.

76. See Blumrosen, The Newport News Agreement-One Brief Shining Moment in the
Enforcement of Equal Employment Opportunity, 1968 U. ILL. L.F. 269.
77. Id. at 275.
78. See Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980
(5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970). Some cooperation among the federal agencies has been achieved within the framework of the judicial enforcement model. See United
States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., 517 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944
(1976).
79. Guidelines have been issued on testing and personnel selection procedures, sex
discrimination, national origin discrimination, and religious discrimination. 29 C.F.R. §§
1604-1607 (1977).
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have deferred to the guidelines as proper interpretations of the Act.8"
The EEOC published regulations that liberalized the administrative process,8" and through its Office of General Counsel, gave its
support to private litigants by filing amicus briefs on many difficult
legal issues. The Department of Justice originally took the position
that, except for those circumstances described in section 705(h),82
it had the exclusive right to represent the EEOC on all Title VII
legal issues. Section 705(h) authorizes EEOC attorneys to appear in
court on behalf of the Commission, and it clearly authorizes the
EEOC attorneys to seek enforcement of demands for information to
complete its investigations, but it is questionable whether it allowed
the EEOC to appear as amicus in private litigation. After some
dispute between the EEOC and the Department of Justice, the
EEOC prevailed and now appears regularly as amicus in private
litigation.
B.

The Department of Justice

Section 707 of Title VII authorized the Attorney General of the
United States to file "pattern or practice" employment discrimination suits. 83 Enforcement was assigned to the Employment Section
of the Department of Justice. Section 705(g)(6)84 empowered the
EEOC to refer cases to the Attorney General either to institute a
pattern or practice suit or to intervene in a pending private action.
Although Congress expressed a preference for voluntary and conciliatory methods of compliance, it is clear that Congress intended the
principal enforcement mechanisms of the Act to be the combination
of administrative enforcement by the EEOC and judicial enforcement under the pattern or practice authority of the Attorney General. Enforcement through private litigation was to play a subordinate yet supportive role to these federal efforts.
In 1971 the Employment Section of the Civil Rights Division
consisted of a chief, thirty-two attorneys, and ten research assistants.8 5 By that date it had filed seventy-five Title VII cases. 8 Some
80. Compare Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 433-34 (1971) (deference given
to EEOC testing guidelines) with General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (EEOC
interpretation of pregnancy disability guideline rejected).
81. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.1-.59 (1977). The EEOC issued revised procedural guidelines in
1977, 42 Fed. Reg. 55,388 (1977).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(b)(2) (Supp. V 1975).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6 (1970 & Supp. V 1975). The 1972 amendment to Title VII
transferred pattern or practice authority to the EEOC. The authority to sue government
units, however, remains vested solely with the Attorney General. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1)
(Supp. V 1975).
84. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-4(g)(6) (Supp. V 1975).
85. 1971 FEDsRAL EFFoRT, supra note 14, at 118.
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of these cases were brought to enforce subpoena demands of the
EEOC; others involved intervention in pending private litigation."7
All seventy-four cases involved discrimination against blacks. Prior
to 1970 the Department of Justice brought no cases against defendants for discrimination against Spanish-surnamed Americans,
women, or American Indians."5 In comparison, between 1965 and
1971 the NAACP Legal Defense Fund," the principal private legal
organization involved in the enforcement of Title VII, and its cooperating attorneys had participated in over 150 cases' 0-more than
twice as many as the Department of Justice.
The power granted by section 707 was potentially one of the
strongest weapons to enforce Title VII, but the Department of Justice did not use all its authorized power. The failure of the Department of Justice to use its authority more vigorously has been attributed to several factors. First, it initially failed to appreciate the
critical role that Congress had assigned to it in the enforcement
scheme." When compared to the vigorous enforcement campaign
that it undertook with the public accommodation section of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964,12 the Justice Department's neglect of Title
VII is apparent. The Department of Justice filed thirteen original
cases and intervened in three cases under the public accommodation section during the first year the section was in effect.'3 The
Department filed only one Title VII pattern or practice suit during
the same period.'4 Only five pattern or practice cases had been filed
86. Below opposite the year are the number of Title VII cases filed by the Employment
Section:
1965
1966
1
1967
1968
26
1969
20
1970
10
1971
18
The above figures were collected from Attorney General Annual Reports for the years 1966,
1968, 1969, 1970, and 1971.
87. See, e.g., Local 53, Int'l Ass'n of Heat & Frost Insulators & Asbestos Workers v.
Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047, 1051 (5th Cir. 1969) (private suits filed in November 1966; Department
of Justice filed suit in December 1966); [1971] ATr'y GEN. ANN. REP. 52-55.

88.

1971

FEDmRAL EFFORT,

supra note 14, at 136.

89. See text accompanying notes 99-106 infra.
90. Hearings on S. 2515, S. 2617 & H.R. 1746 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the
Senate Comm. on Labor and Public Welfare, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 243 (1971) (statement of
Jack Greenberg, Director-Counsel, NAACP Legal Defense & Education Fund, Inc.).
91. 1971 FEnmiuAL EFFORT, supra note 14, at 118.
92. Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 243 (codified at
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a to 2000a-6 (1970)).
93. [1965] ATr'y GEN. ANN. REP. 180-82.
94. [1966] ATr'y GEN. ANN. REP. 211. The case was United States v. Building & Constr.
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by the end of fiscal 1967.11 Second, the Department of Justice failed
to fill the void created by the ineffective performance of the EEOC
and the Office of Federal Contracts Compliance." Third, the growth
in manpower and fiscal resources of the Civil Rights Division did not
keep pace with the vast responsibilities assigned to it under the civil
rights legislation enacted by Congress in the 1960's. In 1971 the Civil
Rights Division was less than half the size of the Antitrust Division,
less than two-thirds the size of the Tax Division, and considerably
smaller than either the Criminal or Civil Divisions. The inadequate allocation of resources to the Civil Rights Division demonstrates the low priority that the federal government assigned to the
elimination of employment discrimination-a priority that was
clearly contrary to the intent of Congress.
C. Private Efforts To Enforce Title VII
Throughout the history. of the enforcement of civil rights laws,
private initiative has pioneered the way with law development programs; large scale governmental enforcement has followed private
initiative.9 The enforcement of Title VII has followed this pattern
largely because of the default of the EEOC and the Department of
Justice. The EEOC at first was ineffective because it had power to
conciliate, but no power to compel. Initially deferring in substantial
part to the EEOC and the Office of Federal'Contract Compliance,
the Department of Justice took a restrictive view of its role in Title
VII enforcement. Development of the law under Title VII, and employment discrimination law generally, is the result of private enforcement. A significant factor in the private enforcement effort was
that for almost a decade prior to Title VII the major civil rights
litigation, primarily school desegregation cases, was brought before
Southern federal judges. Because of the great volume of litigation
following Brown v. Board of Education, ' by 1965 a few of these
judges had become sensitive to claims of racial discrimination.
The organization most involved in Title VII's private enforcement effort is the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund
(Legal Defense Fund). Other civil rights organizations', played a
Trades Council, 271 F. Supp. 447 (E.D. Mo. 1966).
95. [1967] ATr'Y GsN. ANN. REP. 168.
96. 1971 FEDERA EFFoRT, supra note 14, at 118, 136.
97. Id. at 321.
98. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974).
99. Hearingson S. 2515, S. 2617, H.R. 1746, supranote 90, at 246.
100. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
101. E.g., Lawyers Constitutional Defense Committee, Employment Rights Project of
Columbia Law School, and the Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights Under Law. See Cooper,
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substantial role in the development of the law during Title VII's first
decade, but the Legal Defense Fund's program was the most expansive and programmatic. The Legal Defense Fund, a well-known instrument of American liberalism, is a professional resource made
available through the loosely connected efforts of those who seek to
form a powerful institution to reform the injustices of racial discrimination and poverty. In the mid-1960's the Legal Defense Fund annual income of more than four million dollars was raised entirely
from private sources. It now has a staff of more than twenty civil
rights lawyers stationed in New York City, field offices in California
and four Southern states, and a network of about two hundred cooperating lawyers, most of whom are black. The Legal Defense Fund
also receives assistance from social scientists, educators, commercial lawyers, law professors, foundation executives, liberal politicians, corporations, and government administrators.1 02 One of the
Legal Defense Fund's most notable achievements is Brown v. Board
of Education,the United States Supreme Court decision that overruled the "separate but equal" doctrine in public education. A recent study of public interest lawyers described the changes that
have occurred in the Legal Defense Fund since Brown as follows:
The LDF, then, was a very different organization in 1975 from that which
had planned and successfully brought the Brown case two decades earlier. By
the mid-1960's the character of LDF litigation had been so thoroughly transformed that continued management by the staff of a decade earlier would have
been virtually impossible. First, in the 1960's there was defense of the Movement: the freedom-riders, the sit-in demonstrators and the multitudes of other
activists who required counsel during the heyday of Southern civil rights activities. Then, beginning in the late 1960's, the LDF became involved in what was
to become its major field of activity during the next decade: Title VII employment discrimination litigation. A common thread running through these cases
is the need for extensive lawyering manpower. The controlled, limited constitutional litigation of the Brown case could be managed by a handful of lawyers,
a close-knit group of talented civil rights advocates. The staggering caseload
of Movement activists and the subsequent massive workload of employment
discrimination grievances required a substantial number of attorneys and,
concomitantly, the additional resources to handle trials involving questions of
fact.,13

About the time the EEOC was undertaking its initial organizational efforts, the Legal Defense Fund began to implement the iniIntroduction:Equal Employment Law Today, 5 CoLUm. HUMAN RIGms L. REv. 263, 266, 266
n.26 (1973).
102. See M. MELTSNER, CRUEL AND UNUSUAL 6 (1973); LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, ANNUAL
REPORT 1976/77; LEGAL DEFENSE FUND, 30 YEARS OF BUILDING AMERICAN JUSTICE (1970). The

Legal Defense Fund is a separate organization from the NAACP. See Rabin, Lawyers for
Social Change: Perspectives on Public Interest Law, 28 STAN. L.
103. Rabin, supra note 102, at 217.

REv.

207, 216 (1976).
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tial stages of its Title VII enforcement program. On July 2, 1965, the
Legal Defense Fund publicly announced its plan to assist black
persons seeking redress of employment discrimination. ' The aims
of the project, initially limited to the summer of 1965 and ten Southern states, were to inform black persons of their Title VII rights, to
solicit media publication of the new Act, to assist in the preparation
of charges to be filed with the EEOC, to stimulate the interest of
local leadership in an on-going project of a similar nature, and to
train local workers in community organizations to participate in the
enforcement of the new Act. Law students were employed for the
summer to execute the aims of the project. The students met with
local leaders, made presentations to church, business, and social
groups, and worked with civil rights and civic groups to establish
community-based fair employment committees. Attorneys cooperating with the Legal Defense Fund were available to provide legal
assistance when necessary. The Title VII summer project was rather
successful. By the end of the third week after the effective date of
the Act, fifty-four of the 140 charges then pending before the EEOC
had been filed through the efforts of the project.' 5 Many of the 8854
charges received by the EEOC in its first fiscal year were attributa6
ble to the summer project.10
(1)

Employment Discrimination Litigation Strategy

Employment discrimination litigation does not fit neatly into
the traditional civil rights law reform model that was honed to a fine
art in the campaign leading to the landmark decision in Brown v.
Board of Education.Under the Brown model, organizational control
over the sequence and pace of the litigation was the cornerstone of
successful implementation of the Legal Defense Fund's goals.' 7 An
attorney who participated in the early programming of the litigation
strategies of the Legal Defense Fund described the differences:
The difficulties of litigation as a remedial tool without the black community independently generating its pressure are readily apparent. First, persons must know how to make a complaint and, at least initially, they may risk

discharge from employment. The attorney must have sufficient facts about the
internal operation of the plant in order to judge whether a violation of [Title
104. N.Y. Times, July 2, 1965, at 1, col. 3.
105. N.Y. Times, July 30, 1965, at 23, col. 3.
106. 1 EEOC ANN. REP. 58 (1966). See also EEOC,

EMPLOYMENT PATTERNS IN THETEX-

TILE INDUSTRY 10 (1967). The Legal Defense Fund participated in the filing of 1800 charges

with the EEOC during the agency's first eighteen months of existence. LEGAI DEFENSE FUND,
30 YEARS OF LAW WINcH CHANGED AMERICA (1970).
107. See Greenberg, Litigation for Social Change: Methods, Limits, and Role in
Democracy, 29 REc. N.Y.C.B.A. 320 (1974).
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VII has occurred. Such information is difficult to ascertain; whereas in school
desegregation suits the discriminatory pattern in one school district resembled
the pattern in another, employment discrimination patterns differ from industry to industry. Also, the typical voting rights suit involved a Southern state
agency with mediocre attorneys; the defendants in employment cases were the
largest companies in the country, retaining highly paid, competent counsel
who offered vigorous opposition and were extremely adept at delay. With the
added ingredient of a hostile federal Southern judiciary, a single suit could last
two years or more. In the interim, the plaintiffs may have lost faith in the
efficacy of litigation, moved to other jobs, or accepted inadequate settlements.
It is in this kind of trench warfare, with limited staff, limited financial resources, and the inherent capacity in the law for delay, that civil rights attorneys will face serious difficulties in having a major impact on employment
discrimination.'"

Employment discrimination litigation prior to Title VII presented easy and obvious targets such as explicit policies or union
contracts excluding blacks from desirable jobs,'0 ' segregated departments and facilities," 0 or discriminatory pay scales.' Much of the
overt racial discrimination was eliminated by the Plans for Progress' and state FEP Commission activities. By 1965 overt discrimination on the basis of race was not fashionable. The forms of employment discrimination at the time Title VII became effective were
far more subtle. Major employers and unions had begun to cloak
exclusionary and discriminatory policies in superficially neutral
practices, such as testing and educational devices or seniority systems that appeared facially neutral or color-blind but operated to
perpetuate the effects of past discrimination. A 1971 Senate report
concluded:
Employment discrimination as viewed today is a far more complex and
pervasive phenomenon. Experts familiar with the subject now generally describe the problem in terms of "systems" and "effects" rather than simply
intentional wrongs, and the literature on the subject is replete with discussions
of, for example, the mechanics of seniority and lines of progression, perpetuation of the present effect of pre-act discriminatory practices through
various
3
institutional devices, and testing and validation requirements."
108. Clark, The Lawyer in the Civil Rights Movement-Catalytic Agent or CounterRevolutionary?, 19 KA. L. Rav. 459, 468 (1971). Professor Clark was associated with the
Legal Defense Fund during the early days of mapping the Title VII strategy.
109. See, e.g., James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 156 P.2d 329 (1944) (union
with a work monopoly in an area could not enforce contract against blacks, whom it would
not admit to membership because of race).
110. See, e.g., Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Howard, 343 U.S. 768 (1952) (blacks
who were in a segregated bargaining unit entitled to seek injunction against enforcement of
contract to abolish their jobs); Local 12, United Rubber Workers v. NLRB, 368 F.2d 12 (5th
Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 837 (1967).
111. See, e.g., Alston v. School Bd., 112 F.2d 992 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 693
(1940) (school board required to pay black teachers on the same basis as white teachers).
112. See SOVERN, supra note 21, at 103, 140.
113. S. REP. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1971), cited with approval in Franks v.
Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 764 n.21 (1976).
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With many of the overt incidents of deliberate racial or ethnic discrimination abandoned, what was left was systemic discrimination
imbedded in basic personnel policies or organizational structures of
companies and unions. Unlike racial discrimination, many overt
manifestations of sex discrimination continued after 1965 because
employers believed that the "bona fide occupational qualification"
exception exempted their practices from the prohibitions of Title
VII. The more subtle brand of discrimination did not constitute the
easiest target for an effective litigation campaign to eradicate the
effects of job discrimination. Consequently, Title VII litigation required substantial manpower to analyze the voluminous records and
extremely technical factual and legal questions involved. Proving
the existence of discrimination in hiring, testing, seniority, and promotion practices proved demanding."' The great effort required to
litigate a Title VII case severely strains the limited resources of the
private plaintiffs' bar,"' while defendants are able to bear the demands of litigation with less difficulty. Consequently, one court has
aptly described the posture of a private Title VII lawsuit as a
"David-Goliath confrontation.""'
A coherent body of employment discrimination law did not
exist at the time Title VII became effective. Some federal and state
case law"7 existed, but these decisions did not have the coherence
to qualify as a corpus of law." 8 Moreover, much of the employment
discrimination case law at the federal level was constitutionally
premised because discrimination in the private sector was not subject generally to legal restraints. The existing case law did become
useful, but not until efforts were devoted to the development of legal
concepts of discrimination that could be applied to private employers. A litigation strategy patterned after Brown for several reasons
114. See Mazaroff, Surviving the Avalanche: Defendant's Discovery in Title VII
Litigation, ABA LTGATION SECTION 14 (Fall 1977) (copy on file with the Vanderbilt Law
Review) ("Discovery in Title VII cases frequently is so burdensome that employers often
weigh the costs of preparing their responses against the price of an early settlement.").
115. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971), was a relatively easy case to prepare
for trial as compared to most cases tried during the early stages of Title VII enforcement. But
see, e.g., James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings, 559 F.2d 310 (5th Cir. 1977); Pettway v.
American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211 (5th Cir. 1974). Yet over 1000 lawyer hours were
devoted to the litigation of Griggs through the Supreme Court level.
116. Jenkins v. United Gas Corp., 400 F.2d 28, 33 (5th Cir. 1968).
117. See generally GRMNBE.RG,supra note 50, at 154-207.
118. See Cooper, supra note 101, at 265 ("I sometimes have difficulty convincing each
new generation of law students that the Griggs principle is a startling breakthrough in the
jurisprudence of fair employment, since the result is so clearly essential to achieving the equal
employment objective of Title VII."). See also G. CooPER,H. RAB & H. Rutm, FAIR EMPLOYMENT LMGATION

31 (1975).
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would not have been satisfactory to develop employment discrimination law. First, the enforcement authority of the Department of
Justice and the parallel interest of other law reform organizations
and individuals eliminated the possibility of a single entity such as
the Legal Defense Fund having exclusive control over the sequence
and pace of litigation." 9 Second, the Brown paradigm was ill-suited
for the more subtle discriminatory tactics that had replaced the
earlier, more blatant, forms of discrimination. Overt racial discrimination in employment was less prevalent in 1965 than in earlier
years, but the effects of the pre-1965 overt discrimination continued
pervasively. Third, the requirement of exhaustion of administrative
remedies before the EEOC made it likely that ideal "test cases"
would be settled or conciliated in an unsatisfactory way. Finally,
Title VII presented procedural technicalities to private enforcement
that required judicial clarification before substantive interpretations could be reached.' 0
Lawyering skills and techniques could have made the EEOC
administrative process a more responsive conflict resolution device
for employment discrimination claims, but the experience under
older administrative enforcement procedures and the uncertain
start of the EEOC suggested that the limited private resources could
better be used in the judicial enforcement process. A major factor
that ultimately determined the strategy to be used was recognition
of the difficulty in identifying the best constellation of facts that
would best raise the issues considered critical to programmatic law
development. Two such issues were seniority and testing, both having been crystallized by prior case law. In Myart v. Motorola'"' the
hearing examiner found that the tests used by the employer were
culturally biased against the black claimant. This case was brought
to the attention of Congress during the debate over Title VII, and
to assuage the uproar by employers over the potential precedential
value of the decision, section 703(h)'2 2 was included in the Act.123
This section provides that it is not an unlawful employment practice
for an employer to use a professionally developed ability test provided its use, administration, and results are not predicated on an
119.

See Greenberg, supra note 107, at 331.

120.

Before a federal district court can assert jurisdiction, a person claiming to be a

victim of discrimination must first exhaust administrative remedies before the EEOC. See
Belton, supra note 12, at 231-34.
121. 9 RACE REL. L. REP. 1911 (FEPC Ill. 1964).
122. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (Supp. V 1975).
123. See Cooper & Sobol, Seniority and Testing Under Fair Employment Laws: A
GeneralApproach to Objective Criteriaof Hiringand Promotion,82 HARv. L. REv. 1598, 164951 (1969).
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intention to discriminate. Seniority was at issue in Whitfield v.
Steelworkers Local 2708, 1 in which black workers brought a duty
of fair representation claim to end the present and continuing effects of a discriminatory seniority system. The seniority plan had
been negotiated through the collective bargaining process, which
purported to eliminate racially segregated lines of progression
through a testing requirement. The challenged practice withstood
judicial scrutiny, and as expected, defendants placed heavy reliance
upon this decision in subsequent Title VII cases.
The Legal Defense Fund finally settled upon a litigation strategy requiring a large volume of cases in the federal courts, and a
monitoring system to identify cases, issues, and industries that suggested a systematic law reform approach.125 Individual cases were
filed when appropriate, but the principal procedural mold was the
class action. Because the Legal Defense Fund's staff was too small
to handle the anticipated volume of cases, a project to develop
standards for the appointment of counsel was considered.12 This
strategy, however, was assigned a low priority because of the need
first to develop the legal concepts of employment discrimination.
Legal Defense Fund attorneys drafted model pleadings and discovery papers. Professors at leading law schools agreed to "supervise"
special projects such as the recruitment of recent law school graduates associated with major Wall Street law firms to draft discovery
papers, research, and write briefs. Other professors acted as
"sounding boards" on procedural and substantive issues that were
expected to be raised. Contacts were established with the EEOC,
particularly with its Office of General Counsel, to assure that the
124. 263 F.2d 546 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 902 (1959).
125. The tobacco industry became the subject of much of the Legal Defense Fund's
Title VII litigation. See, e.g., Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976); Russell v. American Tobacco Co., 528 F.2d 357 (4th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 935 (1976); Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.),
cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971); Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D.
Va. 1968). The following industries also were the subject of much litigation. Textile: Lea v.
Cone Mills Corp., 438 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1971); see EEOC, EMPLOYMENT PATrERNS INTHE PAPER
INDUSTRY: SUMMARY OF TRANsCREPT OF HEARINo OF JANuARY 12-13 (1967). Pulp and Paper:
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Miller v. International Paper Co., 408
F.2d 283 (5th Cir. 1969). Railroad: Rock v. Norfolk & W.R.R., 473 F.2d 1344 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 412 U.S. 933 (1973); English v. Seaboard Coastline R.R., 10 Empl. Prac. Dec. 10,476
(S.D. Ga. 1975). Steel: Hardy v. United States Steel Corp., 371 F. Supp. 1045 (N.D. Ala.
1973). In some instances various groups and organizations participated jointly in litigation
projects. See, e.g., Sledge v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 12 Empl. Prac. Dec. 11,248 (E.D.N.C.
1976).
126. The courts have not been uhiform on the standard to be applied for appointment
of counsel in Title VII cases. CompareDavis v. Boeing Co., 2 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 62 (W.D.
Wash. 1969) with Norpel v. Iowa Highway Patrol, 4 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. 391 (N.D. Iowa
1971).
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EEOC would have some input from a representative of victims of
employment discrimination on issues of importance to the administrative enforcement process. Regular communication was maintained among the organizations engaged in the enforcement process
to coordinate the various strategies of enforcement. Finally, on October 18, 1965, less than four months after the effective date of the
Act, the Legal Defense Fund and a cooperating attorney filed the
first civil action under Title VI1 27
(2)

Litigation Strategy and Development of the Law

The first several years of private enforcement were devoted to
settling procedural issues. The requirement that plaintiffs exhaust
all their administrative remedies before the EEOC offered defendants an opportunity to raise several issues. Almost all of these
issues were decided in favor of plaintiffs. A principal issue was
whether the EEOC must initiate an investigation and attempt conciliation within sixty days following receipt of a complaint and before notifying the charging party of his right to bring a civil action.
Courts ruled that the jurisdictional prerequisites were satisfied
when a plaintiff filed a timely charge with the EEOC, and after
receipt of a notice of right to sue, filed a timely complaint in the
district court. The failure of the EEOC to undertake an investigation of the claim or to attempt conciliation was not jurisdictionally
fatal. The courts gave an expansive reading to the claims that could
be raised in the complaint based upon the allegations made in the
charge, and they made clear that the judiciary would be the final
arbiter of claims arising under Title VII even though other remedial
avenues, such as state commissions, collective bargaining agreements, or other federal laws and agencies, were available to the
claimants. Most procedural issues were settled in the lower courts,
but one issue, involving the relationship between Title VII and the
arbitration process, was decided by the Supreme Court. The Court,
in Alexander v. Gardner-DenverCo.,"' held that the two remedies
were separate and distinct, but that courts could consider arbitral
decisions in Title VII cases. Alexander raised many questions involving the obligation, appropriateness, and competency of the arbitral process to accommodate claims of employment discrimination
based on race or sex. Today these issues remain unresolved. 2 '
127.
128.
129.
Shop" v.
IN

Brinkley v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., No. 65-1107 (E.D.N.C. 1965).
115 U.S. 36 (1974).
See Edwards, Labor Arbitration at the Crossroads: The "Common Law of the
External Law, 32 ARB. J. 65 (1977). See generallyTHE FUTuRE OF LABoR ARBrrRATION
AMETUCA (J. Correge, V. Hughes, & M. Stone, eds. 1976).
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The judicial developments on the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies and an EEOC regulation'30 allowing a charging
party to request a right to sue letter after the charge has been pending before the EEOC for the period set forth in Title VII provided
plaintiffs an opportunity to begin a program of enforcement more
akin to the Brown paradigm. With the assistance of institutional
attorneys, many complaints were filed with the EEOC, but a right
to sue letter generally was requested only in the cases that offered
the greatest opportunity for law development. The limited private
resources were devoted to these important cases as part of the continuing process of law development. At the same time, other claims
remained in the administrative process until their conclusion, or
until noninstitutional legal representation could be obtained. Even
under this procedure only a limited number of the potentially "good
cases" that were considered appropriate for law development could
be handled by the private plaintiffs' bar.
If the short statutory time periods (then 30 days, now 180 days)
had been upheld as mandatory and the EEOC had been required
to complete the administrative process within these periods, the
result would have been undesirable. The federal courts would have
been flooded with Title VII cases, or many complainants would have
lost their valid claims because of an inability to find an attorney
willing to represent them. On the other hand, if the courts had not
held the time periods to be mandatory, but instead had required the
EEOC to complete the administrative process before the right to sue
letter could be issued, private enforcement efforts could have been
delayed and frustrated.
Plaintiffs' access to Title VII class action proceedings and defendants' inability to obtain jury trials were two procedural matters
critical to private enforcement. Title VII was the first federal civil
rights legislation that imposed an exhaustion of administrative remedies requirement. Defendants argued that class actions allowed
class members who had filed no charges with the EEOC to circumvent this requirement. Defendants also argued that the circumstances surrounding the claim of an aggrieved employee differed substantially from the claims of other aggrieved employees. In addition,
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was amended in 1966
to eliminate the "true," "hybrid," and "spurious" distinctions
under the old rules.'31 Civil rights cases under the old rules had been
130. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.25b(c) (1977).
131. See Frankel, Some PreliminaryObservations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D.
39, 43 (1967).
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classified as spurious; thus if a class action was unsuccessful, the
doctrine of res judicata did not preclude the institution of the same
suit by another member of the class who was unnamed in the first
suit. The 1966 amendment was designed to remedy this situation. 3 '
The courts, however, always have been receptive to Title VII class
actions. Three important cases established the doctrinai framework
for Title VII class actions. In Hall v. Werthan Bag Corp.,1 33 the
district court in allowing a Title VII class action held that:
Racial discrimination is by definition a class discrimination. If it exists, it
applies throughout the class. This does not mean, however, that the effects of
the discrimination will always be felt equally by all the members of the racial
class. For example, if an employer's racially discriminatory preferences are
merely one of several factors which enter into employment decisions, the unlawful preferences may or may not be controlling in regard to the hiring or
promotion of a particular member of the racial class. But although the actual
effects of a discriminatory policy may thus vary throughout the class, the
existence of the discriminatory policy threatens the entire class. And whether
the Damoclean threat of a racially discriminatory policy hangs over the racial
class is a question of fact common to all the members of the class.' 3'

This line of reasoning was followed by the Fifth Circuit in Jenkins
v. United Gas Corp.'35 in reversing a lower court decision denying a
class action. The district court had denied class status on the
ground of mootness because after the case had been filed plaintiff
received the job in question. The district court believed that Title
VII cases were substantively different from school desegregation
cases. Finally, in Oatis v. Crown Zellerbach Corp.3 the Fifth Circuit adopted the Supreme Court's Title II public accommodations
rationale in holding that a Title VII plaintiff is no less a "private
attorney general" than a plaintiff in a public accommodation case.
By successfully obtaining an injunction for himself, the Title VII
class action plaintiff vindicates a policy that Congress considered to
be of the highest priority. 3 ' Reaffirming the Hall v. Werthan Bag
Corp. result that racial discrimination is by definition class discrimination, the Fifth Circuit held that requiring a multiplicity of separate, identical charges to be filed with the EEOC against the same
employer as a prerequisite to court enforcement would frustrate our
system of justice and order. 3 The Supreme Court approved this
132.
(1976).
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

See Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 H.Iv. L. REv. 1318, 1394-1402
251 F. Supp. 184 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).
Id. at 186.
400 F.2d 28 (5th Cir. 1968).
398 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1968).
Id. at 499.
Id.
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result in Albemarle PaperCo. v. Moody. 3 The development of the
Title VII class action was critical in the private enforcement efforts.
It provided an enforcement technique that is substantially similar
to the federal pattern and practice authority. Law development can
occur in individual cases as well, but to require implementation of
an established principle on an individual-by-individual basis soon
would have dissipated the limited resources of the private plaintiffs'
bar.
In school desegregation and voting rights cases the question of
a jury trial is not an issue because usually no monetary relief is
sought. In Title VII cases back pay may be awarded as part of the
relief. " ' Traditionally, monetary relief has been treated as a legal
remedy. Several Supreme Court cases have held that when legal and
equitable claims are asserted in the same case, because the seventh
amendment guarantees a jury trial for the legal claim, the defendant is entitled to have the legal claim tried before the equitable
claim."' The jury trial issue had an impact on the drafting of the
model Title VII complaints. Most of the early charges filed with the
EEOC came from Southern states,"' and consequently most of the
early Title VII litigation took place in federal courts in the South.
Plaintiffs were concerned that meaningful law development would
be impossible if employment discrimination cases had to be tried
before Southern juries. In 1965 neither courts nor legal scholars had
developed a workable concept of discrimination, and it was not
unreasonable to anticipate that judges in their charges to juries
would consider freedom from discrimination to be a moral rather
than a legal right. A jury under such instruction could be expected
to replicate the experience under the human rights/administrative
model.'
With back pay a possibility, a major issue for the courts was
whether Title VII proceedings were purely equitable claims or
whether they involved mixed claims of law and equity. Some Supreme Court precedents supported plaintiffs who argued that Title
VII claims were purely equitable and not subject to the seventh
amendment jury trial guarantee.' In the model complaints the
prayer for relief specifically sought injunctive relief, clearly not enti139. 422 U.S. 405, 414 n.8 (1975).
140. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. V 1975).
141. See, e.g., Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc.
v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959).
142. 1 EEOC ANN. REP. 7 (1966):
143. See notes 43-44 supra and accompanying text.
144. See, e.g., NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (back pay
merely incidental to equitable relief does not carry with it a right to jury trial).
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tling the defendant to a jury trial. To preserve plaintiffs' claims for
back pay, the prayer for relief simply requested "other additional
relief as may appear to the Court to be equitable and just."'4' Eventually the courts held that defendants were not entitled to a jury
trial because Title VII claims are equitable and back pay is simply
part of the equitable relief to which plaintiffs may be entitled. ' The
Supreme Court had not directly addressed this issue, but its decision in Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 4 ' holding that back pay
relief is equitable, clearly supported the rulings of the lower courts.
The resolution of the jury trial issue foreclosed any possibility that
punitive damages would be available in Title VII cases. Although
some lower courts have held that punitive damages are available in
Title VII cases,' 4 8 the Supreme Court decisions in Curtis v.
Loether,'4 a housing discrimination case, and Lorillard Corp. v.
Pons,"" an age discrimination case, support the proposition that
5
punitive damages are not available under Title VII. '
Decisions on the merits began to appear within two years after
the effective date of the Act. The initial cases involved claims of
disparate treatment, such as practices that were facially discriminatory. Defendants in Gunn v. Layne & Bowler, Inc., 5 ' after the effective date of the Act continued dual seniority lines for black and
white employees. Because the prohibition against sex discrimination was included as a "joke" to defeat the Act, it is ironic that the
first cases included several decisions now considered to be the leading cases on sex discrimination. In Weeks v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co.' the company excluded women from certain jobs because of a weight-lifting limitation. In Bowe v. Colgate145. See Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 802 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404
U.S. 1006 (1971) (holding this language in the prayer for relief sufficient to support a claim
for back pay).
146. See, e.g., Johnson v. Georgia Highway Express, Inc., 417 F.2d 1122, 1125 (5th Cir.

1969). An advisory jury may be used in Title VII cases if justifiable circumstances are present.
Moss v. Lane Co., 471 F.2d 853 (4th Cir. 1973); Cox v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 471 F.2d 13
(4th Cir. 1972).

147.

422 U.S. 405 (1975). But see id. at 442-43 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).

148.

Evans v. Sheraton Park Hotel, 503 F.2d 177, 179, 186 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (upholding

$500 award for harassment of plaintiff for filing Title VII complaint; court suggested that the
award was proper as back pay); Rosen v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 477 F.2d 90, 96 (3d
Cir. 1973).
149. 415 U.S. 189 (1974).
150. 98 S. Ct. 866 (1978).

151. See, e.g., EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 515 F.2d 301, 308-10 (6th Cir. 1975),
vacated and remanded, 431 U.S. 951 (1977).
152. 1 Empl. Prac. Dec. 9823 (W.D. Tenn. 1967).
153. 277 F. Supp. 117 (S.D. Ga. 1967), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 408 F.2d 228 (5th
Cir. 1969).
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Palmolive Co.,154 the company and union continued to maintain
gender-based seniority rosters and jobs after Title VI's effective
date.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,'5 5 a product of private enforcement,
is the most important case in employment discrimination law. Its
importance parallels that of Brown v. Board of Education in school
desegregation law. Griggs established fundamental doctrines of
Title VII law. In addition, it validated the lower courts' liberal interpretations of Title VII, which provided meaningful protection for
victims of employment discrimination. Griggs developed from the
programmatic enforcement efforts of the Legal Defense Fund; consequently it illustrates the strategies in the private enforcement of
Title VII. Other leading cases, such as Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody,'5" upholding back pay awards, Franksv. Bowman Transportation Co.,'5" allowing post-Act victims in a seniority discrimination
case to receive retroactive seniority, and Quarles v. Philip Morris,
Inc.,"I allowing seniority adjustments for victims of pre-Act discrimination, developed from some of the same strategies. Most of
the major arguments on issues of Title VII liability were raised in
Griggs.
Like most of the earlier Title VII cases, Griggs arose against the
backdrop of long years of rigid and persistent racial discrimination.
Black employees had been relegated to a handful of physically demanding jobs. Until the early 1960's, locker rooms, showers, drinking fountains, and other facilities were maintained by custom on a
segregated basis.15 For operational purposes, the plant's work force
was divided into five main departments plus the labor department
in which the plaintiffs were employed. In 1955, nine years prior to
the effective date of Title VII, Duke Power initiated a new policy of
hiring and advancement for whites. White applicants, except those
seeking employment in the labor department, were required to have
a high school education or its equivalent. On September 10, 1965,
approximately two months after Title VII became effective, and
almost a year before the EEOC issued its first employment testing
guidelines,' Duke Power instituted a testing program to provide an
154. 272 F. Supp. 332 (S.D. Ind. 1967), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 416 F.2d 711 (7th
Cir. 1969).
155. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
156. 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
157. 424 U.S. 757 (1976).
158. 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. .1968).
159. Record at 27b, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
160. EEOC GUIDELINES ON EMPLOYMENT TESTING PROCEDURES (1966). New and more
detailed guidelines on employee selection procedures, not limited to testing, were subse-
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opportunity for white employees who did not have a high school
education to transfer from the labor department to the more desirable departments. White employees in departments other than the
labor department who did not have a high school diploma were not
required to take the tests.
During pretrial discovery, efforts were made to obtain pass/fail
scores for black and white employees and applicants, but the available evidence was inconclusive. Several of the plaintiffs stated during pretrial depositions that they had taken the tests, but records
could not be located. Of the thirty-seven applicants for employment
between August 2 and January 17, 1977, all six black applicants and
twenty-nine white applicants declined to take the tests."6 ' None of
the applicants were offered employment because no job vacancies
existed. More useful statistics were obtained on the number of black
and white employees who had a high school diploma: three out of
fourteen blacks and fifteen out of eighty-one whites.' The trial
evidence was developed only from Duke Power's Dan River steam
operation, which had a work force of less than 100 employees, even
though Duke Power had facilities in other locations for a combined
work force that exceeded 5000 employees.
On March 15, 1966, the fourteen black employees at the Dan
River steam station filed complaints with the EEOC alleging employment discrimination. These charges grew out of the Title VII
summer project. The EEOC investigation 63' disclosed that the fourteen black employees occupied the same semiskilled job classification of laborer; none had ever been promoted even though some had
as much as twenty years of seniority. No black earned more than
$1.65 per hour, whereas all white employees earned more than $1.81
per hour. Some white employees had been upgraded without testing
even though they lacked a high school education. Moreover, segregated facilities were maintained. Whites were permitted to work
overtime, but blacks were not. Based upon its investigation, the
EEOC made a reasonable cause finding on September 8, 1966. Because conciliation efforts were unsuccessful, on September 9, 1966,
the EEOC notified plaintiffs of their right to file suit in federal
court.
On October 20, 1966, plaintiffs filed a class action complaint in
the United States District Court for the Middle District of North
quently issued by the EEOC. The current guidelines are published at 29 C.F.R. §§ 1607.1.14 (1977).
161. Record at 74b, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
162. Id. at 126b-27b.
163. Id. at lb.
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Carolina. The allegations in the complaint closely paralleled the
EEOC findings, but went one step further on the testing issue.
Plaintiffs alleged that the tests used by Duke Power had not been
developed professionally within the meaning of section 703(h) of
Title VII. Plaintiffs requested injunctive relief, costs, reasonable
attorneys fees, and "such other relief as may appear equitable and
just.""' The prayer for relief did not ask specifically for back pay
because of the concern over the necessity of a jury trial. The phrase
"other relief as may be equitable and just," however, preserved the
claim for back pay. The complaint was grounded solely upon Title
VII. Duke Power questioned the plaintiffs' standing to maintain a
class action, 65' generally denied the allegations, and asserted two
defenses-failure to state a claim and good faith reliance upon an
opinion of the General Counsel for the EEOC. Responding to plaintiffs' testing claim, Duke Power simply asserted that its tests were
applicable to all similarly situated employees regardless of race or
color. On April 12, 1967 the district court ruled in the plaintiffs'
favor on the class action issue.
During pretrial discovery issues concerning the legality of the
departmental structure, the segregated facilities, and the testing
and high school requirements as applied to black applicants were
dropped from the case. The case presented two issues to the district
court. The first issue was whether, given defendant's practice of
relegating blacks to the less desirable department, the defendant
lawfully could condition transfers to the more desirable departments upon the possession of a high school diploma or success on
tests when neither a high school education nor the ability to pass
the tests was required to perform the jobs in the more desirable
departments. The second issue was whether the company's allocation of overtime violated Title VII.
The case was tried on February 6 and 9, 1968. The district court
ruled against the plaintiffs on both issues on September 30, 1968.66
To resolve the first issue the court relied on section 703(h),1 7 which
exempts professionally developed ability tests administered with no
"intention to discriminate" from the prohibitions of Title VII. The
effect of the court's interpretation of the term "intentionally" required Title VII plaintiffs to prove subjective intent to discriminate
on the part of defendants.' 68 The court found that Congress intended
164. See note 145 supra and accompanying text.
165. See notes 131-39 supra and accompanying text.
166. 292 F. Supp. 243, 251-52 (M.D.N.C. 1968).
167. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970).
168. The terms "to discriminate," "intended," and "intentionally" are found in various
sections of Title VII.
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Title VII to be applied prospectively only, and that discriminatory
practices committed prior to July 2, 1965, could not be remedied.
The court recognized that plaintiffs had been victims of past discrimination, but nevertheless held that plaintiffs had been subject
to racially neutral practices since the effective date of the Act. Refusing to follow the principle established in Quarlesv. Philip Morris,
Inc., "I the court said: "If the decision in Quarles may be interpreted
to hold that present consequences of past discrimination are covered
170
by the Act, this Court holds otherwise.'
The court rejected plaintiffs' argument that section 703(h) requires tests to be job-related. Plaintiffs' position was supported by
the 1966 EEOC guideline stating that "professionally developed
ability test means a test which fairly measures the knowledge or
skills required by the particular job or class of jobs which the appellant seeks, or which fairly affords the employer a chance to measure
171
the applicant's ability to perform a particular job or class of jobs.'
The district court read the legislative history of section 703(h) as
protecting the employer's right to use ability tests in hiring and
promotions, so long as the tests have a professional stamp of approval and are applied in a nondiscriminatory manner. The district
court concluded that "[n]owhere does the Act require that employers may utilize only those tests which accurately measure the ability
and skills required of a particular job or group of jobs.' 72 According
to the district court, section 703(h) would have protected the practice of using a college entrance examination to select retail salespersons so long as the exam was prepared by someone in the business
of preparing college entrance exams. In addition, the court sustained the high school education requirement for transferring out of
the labor department by finding a legitimate business purpose underlying this requirement. The district court's holding that
"professionally developed" simply means "prepared by someone
who is a professional testmaker," and its rejection of the Quarles
"present effects of past discrimination" theory made an appeal inevitable.
Griggs was one of the first cases to be tried under Title VII, and
nothing during the pretrial discovery or the trial indicated its potential as a landmark case. Further appellate review probably would
not have been sought had the district court decided the case on the
basis of plaintiffs' failure to show that transfer requirements re169. 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
170. Id.
171.

See note 160 supra.

172.

292 F. Supp. at 250.
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jected blacks at a greater rate than it rejected whites. No direct
evidence on the test rejection rates for blacks and whites was available, but even if such evidence had been available, the small number of employees at the plant probably would not have been a sufficient sample to be statistically significant. Nevertheless, a decision
was made to go through the first level in the appellate process.
By a split decision, the court of appeals reversed the district
court in so far as it denied relief to plaintiffs who had been employed
prior to the testing requirement. ' In an opinion by Judge Boreman,
the court held that the Quarles holding that present consequences
of past discrimination violate Title VII was correct. Under the
Quarles principle, the six plaintiffs who were hired before the institution of the education and testing requirement were entitled to
relief. For those hired after the institution of these requirements, the
court found no continuing effects of prior discrimination. The court
also found no present discrimination because the tests and high
school requirements fulfilled genuine business needs and were
adopted without the subjective intent to discriminate against black
employees and applicants. The court rejected plaintiffs' contention
that the tests must be job-related by stating that "the legislative
history of § 703(h) will not support the view1 '7 that a 'professionally
developed ability test' must be job-related.

Concerned that the majority opinion would have the effect of
sanctioning discriminatory employment practices and noting that
the decision would place the Fourth and Fifth Circuits in direct
conflict, Judge Sobeloff dissented partially. 175 He concurred with the
majority's holding that Title VII prohibitions encompass the present and continuing effects of past discrimination and that Duke
Power had discriminated against the six plaintiffs hired before the
institution of the high school requirement. To Judge Sobeloff, however, using a transfer standard that was not job-related to "freeze
out" blacks from more desirable jobs violated Title VII. The
"freezing" principle was adopted from the voting rights cases.' The
theory describes a requirement that theoretically applies equally 1to
77
all, but maintains an advantage that one class has over another.
173.

Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 420 F.2d 1225 (4th Cir. 1970).

174.

Id. at 1234 (emphasis by the court).

175. Id. at 1237. A few months earlier the Fifth Circuit had decided Local 189, United
Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 919 (1970), one of the leading Title VII cases on the present effects of past discrimination
theory.
176. 420 F.2d at 1247-48. See Fiss, Gaston County v. United States: Fruition of the
Freezing Principle,1969 Sup. CouirT Ray. 379.
177. 420 F.2d at 1247-48.
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Judge Sobeloff adopted the Eighth Circuit's "business needs"
test, which requires a demonstration that an employment criterion
is job-related. Judge Sobeloff found that the business purpose
asserted by Duke Power-to upgrade the work force and to insure
promotability-was insufficient to make the tests job-related. 8
Judge Sobeloff concluded that Duke Power had violated Title VII
by using transfer requirements not related to job performance to
exclude blacks from the more desirable, predominantly white, departments.
Because the appeal to the court of appeals was not entirely
successful for the plaintiffs, the Legal Defense Fund had to decide
whether to appeal to the United States Supreme Court. Griggs was
not an ideal "test case" for review by the Supreme Court. The term
"test case" is not a self-defining concept, and its definition currently
is being debated."' Some commentators argue that appropriate test
cases stretch old concepts. Others look at the case's possible impact
in numbers beyond the immediate litigants, and still others look at
the case's potential for stimulating reform in social institutions. In
deciding whether to appeal Griggs to the Supreme Court, several
elements of the case were considered. The first consideration was
whether the case was intellectually or politically mature. The Legal
Defense Fund had to evaluate critically whether the Court was prepared to make a major change in the law by enunciating a doctrine
that would have widespread impact. After the decision of the court
of appeals, Griggs presented an issue ripe for review. Section 703(h)
had been included in Title VII because of the congressional debate
over Myart v. Motorola.'80 The court of appeals had decided that
tests did not have to be job-related to fall within the protection of
section 703(h). The use of tests and educational requirements was
a form of the subtle, facially neutral racial discrimination that replaced overt discrimination about the time of Title VII's enactment.'8
The second, and more difficult, consideration was whether the
178.
179.

United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969).
See generally J. GREENBERG, JUDICIAL PRoCESS AND SOCAL CHANGES: CONSTITUTioNAL LITIGATION, CASES AND MATERALS (1977); M. METSNER & P. SHRAG, PUBLIC INTEREST
ADVOCAcY: MATRALS FOR CINICAL LEGAL EDUCATION 77-124 (1974) (comments on planning
test litigation); LaFrance, ConstitutionalLaw for the Poor: Boddie v. Connecticut, 1971 DUKE
L.J. 487, 492-97.
180, 9 RACE REL. L. REP. 1911 (FEPC Ill.
1964).
181. A study made by the publisher of the Wonderlic test after Griggs had been decided
in the district court concluded that this test has an adverse impact on blacks. A Study of
38,452 Job Applicants for Affirmative Action Programs 2-4 (1972) (copy on file at the
Vanderbilt Law Review).
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record upon which the case was built presented a sympathetic case
for plaintiffs. First, there was no evidence that blacks at the Duke
Power plant were scoring less well on the tests than whites.', 2 Second, the tests had not been chosen arbitrarily; they had been
adopted on the recommendation of a professional psychologist.
Third, the immediate impact of the court of appeals decision affected only four blacks, and the company was willing to waive the
test requirements if these blacks obtained a high school diploma or
its equivalent. Fourth, Duke Power's announced intentions to install nuclear power equipment made the jobs appear to require some
degree of sophistication." 3 Fifth, the high school diploma requirement could be viewed as a benign requirement to encourage children
to stay in school. Duke Power also had a policy to subsidize certain
employees who sought diplomas through adult education.' Sixth,
other cases such as Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody'85 and Hicks v.
Crown Zellerbach Corp. 5 were being developed in pretrial proceedings to present more appealing records to raise the testing issues.' 7
The third consideration was whether the interests of the plaintiffs were compatible with the interests of all others who would
benefit from a successful resolution of the issue. An affirmance by
the Supreme Court would have affected not only the four blacks who
did not have a high school education but also millions of other
blacks. A reversal could have had the same result. These risks had
to be weighed against the Legal Defense Fund's concern for an institutional programmatic development of Title VII law.
One consideration weighing heavily in favor of attempting to
obtain a writ of certiorari was the powerful dissent by Judge Sobeloff, one of the most respected federal judges in civil rights litigation.
Judge Sobeloff set the tone for the discussion of review in the Supreme Court by stating:
The decision we make today is likely to be as pervasive in its effect as any
we have been called upon to make in recent years....
The case presents the broad question of the use of allegedly objective
employment criteria resulting in the denial to Negroes of jobs for which they
are potentially qualified ....

On this issue hangs the vitality of the employ-

ment provisions (Title VH) of the 1964 Civil Rights Act: whether the Act shall
182. See text accompanying note 161 supra.
183. Record at 93a, Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
184. Id. at 91a, 104a.
185.
186.

422 U.S. 405 (1975).
319 F. Supp. 314 (E.D. La. 1970).

187. A letter setting forth the reasons review should not be sought before the Supreme
Court, as drafted by one of counsel for petitioners, is found in G. COOPER & H. RABB, EQUAL
EMPLOYMENT LAW AND LITGATION 497 (1972).
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remain a potent tool for equalization of employment opportunity or shall be
reduced to mellifluous but hollow rhetoric."'

Moreover, the reality of chance was an ever-present consideration.
Much that occurs in the courts is not subject to control, such as the
chance occurrences of any lawsuit, the defection of the plaintiffs or
capitulation of defendants, disagreement among counsel, unanticipated precedents, and the effect of public sentiment and political
currents on adjudication. The EEOC and Department of Justice
argued strenuously against obtaining a writ of certiorari. They believed that Griggs was an aberrant decision whose record was
weaker than other cases pending in the lower courts.
A decision was made to seek review, and the petition for a writ
of certiorari was filed on April 9, 1970. The question raised in the
petition was whether the use of psychological tests and related formal education requirements as employment criteria violated the
race discrimination prohibition of Title VII if they are not related
to job performance and disqualify many blacks but few whites. The
Supreme Court granted review on June 29, 1970, and arguments
were heard on December 19, 1970.
On March 31, 1971, the Supreme Court rendered its opinion.'89
In an opinion written by Chief Justice Burger, a unanimous Court,
with Justice Brennan not participating, reversed the court of appeals. Griggs firmly established the principle that although subjective motivation, when shown, will establish the requisite intent to
establish a violation of the Act, intent under Title VII does not
require a showing of subjective motivation.1 90 A cornerstone of
Griggs is its holding that "Congress directed the thrust of the Act
to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation.""' Thus, when a plaintiff can demonstrate that an employment practice has a disparate impact or effect upon a protected
group of which he or she is a member, a prima facie violation is
established, and the plaintiff is entitled to relief unless the defendant can show business necessity.19
The issue in Griggs was the legality of a testing practice, but
the legal theory enunciated has been applied to a wide range of
employment practices such as recruitment, assignment, seniority
93
and promotion practices, and supervisory selection procedures.
188. 420 F.2d 1225, 1237-38 (4th Cir. 1971) (Sobeloff, J., dissenting).
189. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
190. "The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair
in form, but discriminatory in operation." Id. at 431.
191. Id. at 432 (emphasis by the Court).
192. Id. at 431. ("The touchstone is business necessity.").
193. See Belton, supra note 12, at 246 nn.135-41.
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Griggs also laid the foundation for other principles of Title VII law
that have been more fully developed in subsequent Supreme Court
and lower federal court decisions. Other post-Griggs Title VII principles include the use of statistical evidence to establish a prima
facie case, 94' the order and allocation of the burdens of proof,'95 the
doctrine of business necessity,'96 the standard of job relatedness,'97
and the deference to be accorded to EEOC guidelines."'
Before Griggs the lower federal courts had enunciated a legal
theory primarily applicable to the seniority discrimination cases.
Seniority practices affected adversely blacks and females who were
employed before 1965. In many of the seniority discrimination cases,
employers had engaged in overt hiring discrimination before the
effective date of Title VII. Although the overt discrimination had
ceased before 1965, collective bargaining agreements containing facially neutral seniority systems, which determined the order and
preference of job movement, perpetuated the effects of the pre-Act
discrimination. In these cases the issue was whether section
703(h),' which provides that it is not unlawful to apply different
terms or conditions of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority
system as long as no intention to discriminate exists, protects a
seniority system that perpetuates pre-Act discrimination. Quarles
v. Philip Morris, Inc.," °° the seminal Title VII seniority discrimination case, which developed out of charges filed with the EEOC
through the Legal Defense Fund summer project, held that on the
above facts a violation can be established under a perpetuation or
"freeze" theory. Quarles presented the first opportunity to test the
potential precedential impact of Whitfield v. Steelworkers Local
2708.21 Judge Butzner rejected defendants' invitation to dispose of
Quarles on the Whitfield v. Steelworkers Local 2708 rationale.
Judge Butzner held that the proper construction of section 703(h)
and its legislative history made it apparent that "Congress did not
intend to freeze an entire generation of Negro employees into dis194. See, e.g., Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 225 n.34 (5th Cir.
1974).
195. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Plaintiff has
the burden of demonstrating a prima facie violation; defendant has burden of proving business necessity, a legitimate nondiscrimination reason, a bona fide occupational qualification,
or undue hardship.
196. See, e.g., Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed,
404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
197. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975).
198. Id.
199. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1970).
200. 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968).
201. 263 F.2d 546 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 902 (1959).
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criminatory patterns that existed before the act. 2 °2 Judge Butzner
ruled that "[p]resent discrimination may be found in contractual
provisions that appear fair upon their face, but which operate
unfairly because of the historical discrimination that undergirds
them. '11 3 The critical holding in Quarles was that a seniority system
that has its genesis in discrimination is not bona fide according to
2
section 703(h) . 04

The Quarles theory was developed more fully in Local 189,
United Papermakers & Paperworkersv. United States."' Local 189
began with federal efforts to enforce Executive Order 11,246. After
0 ' rea federal district court had entered a preliminary injunction"
straining federal officers from imposing sanctions on a federal contractor for failing to revise its seniority practices to assure equal
opportunity for black employees, the United States filed a pattern
or practice suit against the company and unions. At the time the
pattern or practice action was filed, several private Title VII actions
were pending in the same court against some of the defendants."'
Robinson v. LorillardCorp.,2 11 another Legal Defense Fund case
involving seniority discrimination, formulated a three-part business
necessity test that a defendant must satisfy to rebut a prima facie
Title VII violation established under either the Griggs effect theory
or the Quarles-Local189 perpetuation theory. The business necessity test is not found in the statutory language of Title VII. Although
a business necessity rationale was applied by the Supreme Court in
Griggs and by the Fifth Circuit in Local 189, neither case formulated
in any detail the parameters of the test. The business necessity test,
as formulated in Robinson, requires the defendant to show that his
interests in continuing the challenged practice are "sufficiently
compelling" to justify the adverse impact on the employment opportunities of a protected class, that it effectively carries out the
business purpose that it is alleged to serve, and that "no acceptable
alternative policies or practices" that would equally serve the business purpose with less adverse impact2 9 on the protected class exist.
202. 279 F. Supp. at 516.
203. Id. at 518.
204. Id. at 517.
205. 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970).
206. Crown Zellerbach Corp. v. Wirtz, 281 F. Supp. 337 (D.D.C. 1968). For a summary
of the peculiar circumstances out of which Local 189 arose, see Cooper & Sobol, supra note
123, at 1620 n.82.
207. See, e.g., Hill v. Crown Zellerbach Corp., No. 67-286 (E.D. La., filed March 1,
'1967). Local 189 was filed on January 30, 1968.
208. 444 F.2d 791 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
209. 444 F.2d at 798.
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The impact of the business necessity test on employment discrimination law is perhaps as profound as the Griggs effect test; both are
equalizing factors in the David-Goliath confrontation.
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,2" ' a private non-class
action case, the Supreme Court held that an individual plaintiff can
establish a prima facie violation of Title VII by showing that he is
a member of a class protected by the Act, that he applied and was
qualified for a vacancy, that he was rejected, and that after the
rejection the employer continued to look for applicants with qualifications similar to those of the plaintiff. Absent rebuttal evidence or
a showing by the defendant of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory business purpose, the plaintiff is entitled to relief. McDonnell Douglas
established the "black letter law" on the order and allocation of
proof in Title VII litigation, gave substantive content to Griggs, and
implied approval of Quarles."'
The legal principles enunciated in Griggs, McDonnell Douglas,
Quarles, Local 189, Robinson, and subsequent decisions established
a substantial body of substantive Title VII law. 2 2 These substantive
developments on liability set the stage for concentration on devising
appropriate remedial measures. The courts were receptive to expansive and liberal construction of the remedial authority provided in
section 706(g) of the Act. This section provides that, upon a finding
of liability, "the court may enjoin the respondent from engaging in
such unlawful practice, and order such affirmative action as may be
'
the so,2,3
"..
The courts held that section 703(j), 214
appropriate ..
called antipreferential treatment provision, does not preclude the
imposition of quotas, goals, or timetables, as long as they are imposed to correct present effects of past discrimination or current
unlawful employment practices.1 5 Appropriate seniority adjustments under a "rightful place" theory were ordered to remedy both
the pre-Act and post-Act discriminatory effects of facially neutral
seniority practices.2 16 Recruitment and training programs were ordered,21' 7 and objective selection criteria were required to replace
210. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
211. See Jones, supra note 15, at 8-9.
212. See generally Belton, supra note 12.
213. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. V 1975).
214. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j) (1970).
215. For cases on this point, see those collected in Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 501
F.2d 622, 631 (2d Cir. 1974).
216. See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747 (1976); Pettway v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 494 F.2d 211, 247-49 (5th Cir. 1974).
217. See, e.g., EEOC v. Detroit Edison Co., 365 F. Supp. 87, 120-21 (E.D. Mich. 1973),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 515 F.2d 301 (6th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 431 U.S. 951
(1977).
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subjective criteria. 21
The concept of affirmative action and the back pay award are
two critical developments in the remedial provisions of Title VII.
These developments offer an interesting comparison of congruence
and contrast between public and private enforcement efforts. The
notion of affirmative action was introduced first in the effort to
eliminate employment discrimination when President Kennedy issued Executive Order 10,925. This order required the inclusion of
the following clause in all contracts with the federal government:
"The contractor will take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are employed, and that employees are treated during employment, without regard to their race, creed, color, or national origin. ' '2 1 No explanation of the term affirmative action was included
in Executive Order 10,925. The requirement of affirmative action
was retained in Executive Order 11,246,220 issued by President Johnson in September 1965, and the subsequent executive order22 that
created the Office of Federal Contracts Compliance within the Department of Labor, but neither order provided any details about the
remedial measures that affirmative action should include. Section
706(g) of Title VII provides that a district court may "order such
affirmative action as may be appropriate ' 212 to remedy a violation
of the Act. References are made to hiring, reinstatement, and back
pay in this section, but like the executive orders, section 706(g)
makes no reference to what remedial measures affirmative action
should include. In November 1967 a Title VII private action was
filed involving nepotistic union referral practices in Vogler v.
McCarty.22 A month later the Department of Justice filed a pattern
or practice suit against the defendants in Vogler. On May 31, 1967,
the district court held that plaintiffs were entitled to relief and
subsequently entered an injunction requiring future referrals of
blacks on an alternating, one-for-one, basis with whites.2 4 The court
relied on the authority of section 706(g) to order affirmative action
without specific reference to section 703(j). Vogler was the first in218. See, e.g., Rowe v. General Motors Corp., 457 F.2d 348, 358-59 (5th Cir. 1972).
219. Exec. Order No. 10,925, 3 C.F.R. 448, 450 (1959-1963 Compilation) (emphasis
added). Executive Order 11,375, which became effective in October 1968, amended Executive
Order 11,246 by forbidding discrimination on the basis of sex by federal contractors. 3 C.F.R.
684 (1968-1970 Compilation).
220. 3 C.F.R. 339-410 (1964-1965 Compilation).
221. Exec. Order No. 11,478, 3 C.F.R. 803 (1966-1970 Compilation).
222. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. V 1975) (emphasis added).
223. 294 F. Supp. 368 (E.D. La. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Local 53, Int'l Ass'n of Heat &
Frost Workers v. Vogler, 407 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1969).
224. 294 F. Supp. 368 (E.D. La. 1967). The district court also required this formula in
its final grant of relief. Vogler v. McCarty, 62 Lab. Cas. 6611 (E.D. La. 1970).
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stance of judicial imposition of relief in the nature of a quota based
solely upon race. Other district courts followed the one-for-one for225
mula.
Carter v. Gallagher,225 a private class action case based upon
sections 1981 and 1983 and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, sought relief from employment discrimination
in the Minneapolis Fire Department. Finding that plaintiffs were
entitled to relief, the district court ordered the immediate certification of twenty qualified minority applicants. The Eighth Circuit
reversed the lower court's holding because the appellate court
viewed the specific number of job slots allocated to minority persons
as an absolute preference that would infringe upon the employment
opportunities of nonminorities. Nevertheless, the Eighth Circuit
adopted a one-for-two formula resulting in the certification of
twenty qualified minority applicants.2 2 Carter represents a major
step in the development of the idea that affirmative action, in appropriate circumstances, can justify numerical goals or quotas.
The concept of affirmative action began to develop meaning in
an administrative context in May 1968 when the Department of
Labor issued regulations on Executive Order 11,246.2 These regulations required nonexempt government contractors with more than
fifty employees and contracts in excess of a certain dollar amount
to develop affirmative action plans for each of its establishments.
The affirmative action plans had to include an identification and
analysis of minority employment "problem areas." Employers were
required to establish goals and timetables to correct the deficiencies. Two years later in 1970, the Department of Labor issued a
second set of regulations, 229 which provided some interpretative
guidelines to many of the terms used in the earlier regulations. The
later regulations provided that an affirmative action plan under
Executive Order 11,246 must include:
an analysis of areas within which the contractor is deficient in the utilization
of minority groups and women, and further, goals and timetables to which the
contractor's good faith efforts must be directed to correct the deficiencies and,
thus to achieve prompt and full utilization of minorities and women, at all
levels and in all segments of his work force where deficiencies exist.211
225. See, e.g., United States v. Local 86, Int'l Ass'n of Ironworkers, 315 F. Supp. 1202
(W.D. Wash. 1970), affl'd, 443 F.2d 544 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971); United
States v. Central Motor Lines, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 478 (W.D.N.C. 1970).
226. 3 Empl. Prac. Dec. 8205 (D. Minn.), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 452 F.2d 315
(8th Cir. 1971), modified, 452 F.2d 315, 327-32 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972).
227. 452 F.2d at 327-32.
228. 41 C.F.R. § 60-1 (1977).
229. 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.10 (1977).
230. Id.
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The following statement of affirmative action was included:
An affirmative action program is a set of specific and result-oriented procedures to which a contractor commits himself to apply every good faith effort.
The objective of those procedures plus such efforts is equal employment opportunity. Procedures without effort to make them work are meaningless; and
effort, undirected by specific and meaningful procedures, is inadequate.2'1

The legality of Executive Order 11,246 and its regulations was at-

tacked in ContractorsAssociation of EasternPennsylvania v. Secretary of Labor.2 32 Plaintiffs argued that neither the "bona fide senior-

ity system" language in section 703(h) nor the antipreferential
treatment provision in section 703(j) protected the affirmative action plan at issue, the Philadelphia Plan, which required specific
quotas of minority manpower. The court did not reach plaintiffs'
argument based upon section 703(j). Relying upon the developing
Title VII law to support the remedial measures used by the Department of Labor to implement the executive order, the court held that
nothing in section 703(h) prohibits the imposition of quotas under
the executive orders.23 Both the public and private enforcement
efforts were seeking simultaneously to establish as appropriate
within the concept of affirmative action relief similar to quotas.
Section 706(g)2 3 of Title VII provides that a court may award

back pay as part of the affirmative relief to which a victim of employment discrimination is entitled. Nothing in the statute precludes the Department of Justice from seeking back pay relief in
pattern or practice litigation. The Department of Justice, however,
initially took the position that it would not seek back pay in pattern
or practice cases. 21 Private enforcement developed the back pay

remedy. Private plaintiffs urged the courts to adopt a standard for
the award of back pay similar to the standard that the Supreme
Court had established for the award of attorneys fees in cases arising
under the public accommodations section of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.231 The Supreme Court had held that a prevailing plaintiff
should be denied attorneys fees only if special circumstances rendered this award unjust. Generally, lower courts agreed that this
was an appropriate back pay relief standard.2

37 The

Supreme Court,

231. Id.
232. 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971).
233. The court cited with approval Griggs, Local 189, Vogler, and Quarles. 442 F.2d at
172 n.46.
234. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (Supp. V 1975).
235. Compare United States v. Central Motor Lines, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 532, 561
(W.D.N.C. 1971) with United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., 517 F.2d 826 (5th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976).
236. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400 (1968).
237. E.g., Baxter v. Savannah Sugar Refining Corp., 495 F.2d 437, 442-43 (5th Cir.),
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however, refused to apply the statutory attorneys fees standard to
back pay awards. In Albemarle PaperCo. v. Moody, the Court held
that "[b]ackpay should be denied only for reasons which, if applied
generally, would not frustrate the central statutory purposes of
eradicating discrimination throughout the economy and making
persons whole for injuries suffered through past discrimination." '
Private plaintiffs also developed the theory of front pay.23 According to this theory, victims of employment discrimination are entitled to monetary compensation until they reach positions that they
would have occupied if it were not for the unlawful discrimination.
By the time the Department of Justice decided to seek back pay in
its pattern or practice cases, the law on back pay substantially had
been developed.
The emergence of a coherent body of employment discrimination law provided the necessary background for meaningful implementation of the national policy against employment discrimination. Cases such as Griggs v. Duke Power Co. and Albemarle Paper
Co. v. Moody provided the parameters of a litmus test to determine
Title VII liability. These cases also made "good faith" efforts to
render employment discrimination meaningless if the litmus
showed prima facie liability, unless some visible manifestations also
were demonstrated. The potential of multi-million dollar awards for
unlawful employment discrimination emphasized that failure to
comply with Title VII exposed respondents to substantial financial
liability.
This coherent body of law made it possible for the federal government to negotiate settlements with AT&T, 240 as well as nation42
24
wide settlements with the trucking ' and basic steel industries.
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1003 (1974); Head v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 486 F.2d 870, 876 (6th
Cir. 1973).
238. 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975).
239. See, e.g., Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 920 (1976); Bush v. Lone Star Steel Co., 373 F. Supp. 526, 558 (E.D. Tex. 1974);
Note, Front Pay-Prophylactic Relief Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 29
VAND. L. REv. 211 (1976).
240. See 8 EEOC ANN. REP. 25-26 (1973); EEOC v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 365 F.
Supp. 1105 (E.D. Pa. 1973), aff'd, 506 F.2d 735 (3d Cir. 1974). The agreement settled a
complaint brought under § 707 of Title VII as well as charges of employment discrimination
that the EEOC had filed with the FCC in opposing AT&T's request for approval of rate
increases. Under this settlement AT&T agreed to pay back pay of up to $15 million to 1500
women and minority employees. See also EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPoRTUNrrY AND THE AT&T
CASE (P. Wallace ed. 1976) (decree included as Appendix A at 283). Under a similar agreement in 1974, AT&T agreed to pay $7 million to management level employees and an additional $23 million in wage adjustments. 8 EEOC ANN. REP. 25 (1973).
241. In re Trucking Industry Employment Practice Litigation, 384 F. Supp. 614 (Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation 1974).
242. United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Indus., 517 F.2d 826 (5th Cir. 1975), cert.
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Other employers and unions became more amenable to voluntary
compliance agreements with the EEOC and private plaintiffs to
remedy individual claims of employment discrimination and to take
steps to revise employment policies to assure that similar claims
would not arise in the future. 243 Even though the EEOC did not have
enforcement power prior to 1974 and the Department of Justice was
not as supportive of the EEOC as Congress had envisioned, the
threat of private enforcement helped restore some of the credibility
and effectiveness that the EEOC had lost because of its earlier
organizational and staffing deficiencies.
Because civil rights litigation has been unattractive to the private bar, 24 civil rights laws, such as school desegregation, voting
rights, and jury discrimination, historically have been enforced by
private law reform organizations such as the Legal Defense Fund. 45
The development of employment discrimination law reduced the
unpopular status of employment discrimination cases and encouraged attorneys who were not associated with law reform organizations to represent Title VII plaintiffs. By funding law school clinical
courses and other programs, the EEOC provided incentive for the
private bar to engage in widespread enforcement of Title VII.
Although the most active Title VII attorneys have been a small
group, generally associated with law reform organizations and have
become specialists in this area of the law, an increasing number of
noninstitutional lawyers have begun to represent Title VII plaintiffs
in the "one-on-one" individual non-class action cases.2 47 This development is underscored by the increase in the number of Title VII
cases filed between 1970 and 1976. In 1970 when the Administrative
Office of the United States Courts began to keep statistics on cases
by classification, 344 Title VII cases were filed. By 1976 the volume
of Title VII litigation had increased to 5321, 35.4 percent greater
than the preceding year and 1447 percent greater than 1970.248
Employment discrimination cases represented 43 percent of all civil
rights cases filed in 1975.249 This development has been described as
denied, 425 U.S. 944 (1976). A back pay fund of approximately $31 million was established.
9 EEOC ANN. REP. 1-2 (1974).
243. See, e.g., [1978] 2 EMPL. PRAc. GUIDE (CCH)
5350 (law firm recruiting and
hiring conciliation agreement).
244. See note 53 supra and accompanying text.
245. See Rabin, supra note 102, at 214-18.
246. See Report by EEOC Chairman Perry to Senate Labor Committee on Commission's Current Status and Projected Improvements, reprinted in 1975 FAIR EMPL. PRAC. (BNA
PUBLICATION No. 279, pt. 2 at 25 (Spec. Supp.)).
247. See Maslow, The Bonhomie of the Plaintiffs' Bar,Jums DOCTOR, Sept. 1974, at 31.
248. 1976 U.S. ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. CouNTS ANN. REP. 204.
249. Id. at 129.
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"staggering." 20 The possibility of obtaining attorneys fees2.' was, no
doubt, an incentive to the private plaintiffs' bar as enticing as the
coherent body of law.
The first decade of enforcement under Title VII spawned three
generations of issues. Each did not develop in distinct periods, but
analytical distinctions are discernable. The first generation embraced procedural problems about the relationship between the
administrative process and judicial enforcement. Some of these issues involved the federal effort, but the majority involved the private enforcement effort. The second generation of issues dealt with
the definition and proof of discrimination. Here, too, private enforcement efforts shouldered the major responsibility. The third
generation presented issues of fashioning appropriate affirmative
relief and implementation. Private enforcement made a substantial
contribution to the development of appropriate affirmative relief,
but large-scale implementation required resources available only to
federal agencies. In considering these three sets of issues the federal
courts broadly construed Title VII to provide effective enforcement
of the national policy against employment discrimination.
V.

THE NEXT DECADE: A POTENT TOOL OR MELLIFLUOUS RHETORIC

Since the beginning of the second decade of Title VII enforcement new issues have surfaced that threaten the vitality of the
limited progress made during the first decade. The major issue to
surface in recent years, "reverse discrimination," concerns what
appears to be a countermovement to the overall enforcement effort.
This countermovement appears in many forms, but its principal
thrust is expressed frequently in charges of "reverse discrimination"
against whites, especially white males. The proponents of this countermovement emphasize the conflict between the obligations of
"affirmative action" and claims of "reverse discrimination." The
terms "affirmative action" and "reverse discrimination" present
difficult conceptual problems. 212 A reading of the cases2 3 and commentary24 in this area suggests that the same conduct falls under
250. Id. at 204. The Department of Justice transferred 94 pattern or practice cases to
the EEOC in 1974. 9 EEOC ANN. REP. 7 (1974). The EEOC filed 93 cases in fiscal 1974, id.
at 7, and had 180 cases on its docket in fiscal 1975.
251. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1970).
252. Compare Rios v. Steamfitters Local 638, 501 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1974) with Kirkland
v. Department of Correctional Servs., 520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1975).
253. See, e.g., McAleer v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 416 F. Supp. 435 (D.D.C. 1976);
Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem.Corp., 415 F. Supp. 761 (E.D. La. 1976), affl'd, 563 F.2d
216 (5th Cir. 1977); Cramer v. Virginia Commonwealth Univ., 415 F. Supp. 673 (E.D. Va.
1976).
254. See, e.g., REvERsE DISCRIMINATION (B. Gross ed. 1977).
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both labels, yet there appears to be a belief that the terms describe
different phenomena. The national debate generated by claims of
"reverse discrimination" centers around the issue whether remedial
measures described as "quotas," "preferential treatment," "goals
and timetables," or "mathematical ratios" are legally permissible
in the national effort to eliminate the present and continuing effects
of discrimination. 25 This debate has divided many old friends
within the traditional civil rights coalition.2 51 The Supreme Court
contributed to the affirmative action/reverse discrimination debate
with its decision in McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation
Co. 25 In McDonald the Court held that Title VII and section 1981
are available to both black and white persons to redress employment discrimination. The decision seems correct on the Title VII
aspect, but it seems questionable as to section 1981, which provides
that all persons shall be guaranteed the right to make and enforce
contracts "as is enjoyed by white citizens." The right guaranteed in
section 1981 is to be measured by the treatment given to "white
citizens." The effect of the McDonald decision is to eliminate the
"white citizen" statutory standard.
A clear statement of policy on the affirmative action/reverse
discrimination debate has yet to emerge in the federal enforcement
effort. The EEOC has demonstrated some initiative by proposing
the adoption of guidelines on affirmative action.2 8 These proposed
guidelines purport to offer defendants who attempt to comply with
Title VII without administrative or judicial involvement the protection afforded by section 713(b) of Title VI. 59 This section provides
a complete defense to defendants who prove that they in good faith
conformed with a written EEOC interpretation or opinion.
The concept of affirmative action had a ring of optimism about
it in the early enforcement efforts of Title VII and related laws and
orders. Then it was generally thought to be a new and innovative
approach to end discrimination, with an emphasis on the inclusion
of disadvantaged classes of blacks, other minorities, and women.
But the concept now connotes discrimination against white males.
The affirmative action/reverse discrimination debate is a profound
255. The national debate has crystalized around the case of Bakke v. Regents of Univ.
of California, 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal. Rptr. 680 (1976), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part, 98 S. Ct. 2733 (1978).
256. Compare Bell, Book Review, 25 EMORY L.J. 879 (1976) with Glazer, Author's
Reply, 26 EMORY L.J. 399 (1977). See also N.Y. Times, Sept. 20, 1977, § 1, at 34, col. 1.
257. 427 U.S. 273 (1976).
258. EEOC Proposed Guidelines on Remedial and/or Affirmative Action, 42 Fed. Reg.
64,826 (1977).
259. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(b) (1970).
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challenge to the efficacy of the Griggs concept of discrimination.
The ultimate resolution of this issue will determine in substantial
part the level and intensity of public and private enforcement ef2
forts in Title VII's second decade.
All of the Title VII cases heard by the Supreme Court during
the first decade of enforcement were the result of private enforcement efforts; the government was a party in none of these cases. The
Supreme Court's 1976 Term was its most active in the area of employment discrimination.2 Analyzing the Title VII cases decided by
the Court during this Term, Professor Harry T. Edwards noted that
the Court manage[d] to limit the meanings of "sex discrimination" and
"religious discrimination" under Title VII; broaden the meaning of the "bona
fide seniority system" exception under Title VII; define the burdens of proof
in "pattern and practice" cases; explain the evidentiary weight to be given to
statistical evidence and proofs concerning "relevant labor markets" in employment discrimination cases; and decide a number of miscellaneous issues having to do with class actions
2 suits, statute of limitations matters and questions
of appropriate remedies. 11

The 1976-1977 decisions strongly suggest that the three generations
of issues spawned during the first decade of Title VII must be sub63
stantially reexamined.
In InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters v. United States,2 11
the Court held that a facially neutral seniority system that perpetuates into the post-Act period the effects of pre-Act discrimination
is protected as bona fide under section 703(h) unless plaintiffs can
demonstrate that the system had its genesis in unlawful discrimination.2 5 The Court recognized that, but for section 703(h), such a
260. See Address by Drew S. Days, III, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, Department of Justice, at Yale Law School (March 1, 1978) (copy on file at the
Vanderbilt Law Review).
261. The Supreme Court decided ten Title VII cases during the 1976-1977 Term. Cases
not discussed in the text are: United Airlines, Inc. v. McDonald, 432 U.S. 385 (1977) (punitive
class member may file timely petition for intervention to seek appellate review of district
court denial of class certification); Occidental Life Ins. Co. v. EEOC, 432 U.S. 355 (1977)
(EEOC not limited in filing suit by the 180-day requirement in section 706(b)(1)); East Tex.
Motor Freight Sys., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 431 U.S. 395 (1977) (failure to qualify for class certification under Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure precludes class relief); Electrical
Workers Local 790 v. Robbins & Myers, Inc., 429 U.S. 229 (1976) (filing grievance pursuant
to collective bargaining agreement does not toll period within which charge must be filed with
the EEOC).
262. Address by Harry T. Edwards, ABA Labor Relations Section Annual Convention
(Aug. 22, 1977), reprintedin 95 LAB. EL. REP. (BNA) 329-30 (1977).
263. See generally Belton, supra note 12.
264. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
265. The Court recognized that its decision was contrary to the Quarles line of cases.
Concededly, the view that § 703(h) does not immunize seniority systems that perpetuate the effects of prior discrimination has much support. It was apparently first
adopted in Quarles v. Philip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp. 505 (E.D. Va. 1968). The court
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system would be unlawful according to the Griggs concept of discrimination. The Court construed section 703(h) to require pre-Act
discriminatees to demonstrate purposeful discrimination by defendants to lock-in or freeze blacks into their pre-Act status. The
Teamsters purposeful discrimination standard is analogous to the
standard enunciated by the Court for employment discrimination
claims based upon constitutional grounds. In Washington v. Davis2"
the Court held that the Griggs effect test is inapplicable to constitutional claims, requiring instead a showing of purposeful discrimination. The lower courts had construed the term "intent" used in the
various sections of Title VII as a unitary concept."' Teamstersholds
that this construction is erroneous in so far as facially neutral seniority systems are involved. Both Griggs and Teamsters involved an
interpretation of section 703(h). The testing proviso and the bona
fide seniority system proviso in this section were the subject of much
congressional debate,2" and both provide a limited exemption if the
discrimination is not the result of an intention to discriminate on
prohibited grounds. It thus seems ironic that the same section would
yield different interpretations on the two subjects.
The decision in United Air Lines, Inc. v. Evans2" could compound the adverse ramifications of the Teamsters decision. Plaintiff
in Evans was forced to resign from her job in 1968 because of a
company rule that prohibited female flight attendants to be married. Plaintiff was rehired in 1972 and thereafter brought a Title VII
action for restoration of the seniority that she had forfeited because
of her forced resignation. The Court held that plaintiffs claim was
time-barred because she had failed to file with the EEOC a charge
within ninety days after her forced resignation. 0 The Court relied
on Teamsters to hold also that section 703(h) protects both pre-Act
there held that "a departmental seniority system that has its genesis in racial discrimination is not a bona fide seniority system." . . . The Quarles view has since enjoyed
wholesale adoption in the Courts of Appeals. . . . Insofar as the result in Quarles and
in the cases that followed it depended upon findings that the seniority systems were
themselves "racially discriminatory" or had their "genesis in racial discrimination,"
. . . the decisions can be viewed as resting upon the proposition that a seniority system
that perpetuates the effects of pre-Act discrimination cannot be bona fide if an intent
to discriminate entered into its very adoption.
431 U.S. at 346 n.28 (emphasis by the Court).
266. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
267. The terms "to discriminate," "intended," and "intentionally" are used repeatedly
throughout Title VII. A statutory definition of these terms, however, is not included. See, e.g.,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a), (b), (e), (h) (1970 & Supp. V 1975); 2000e-3(a) (Supp. V 1975); 2000e5(g) (Supp. V 1975).
268. See generally Cooper & Sobol, supra note 123.
269. 431 U.S. 553 (1977).
270. 431 U.S. at 558.
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and post-Act facially neutral seniority systems. Holding that the
plaintiffs filing had been timely, the lower court relied upon the
well-established continuing violation theory developed in the seniority discrimination cases. 21' Under this theory the time to file a
charge with the EEOC begins anew each day that the discriminatory seniority system is operative. Although not directly addressing
the validity of the continuing violation theory, Evans implies that
this theory, once thought firmly established, is open to further examination.
Sections 701(j) 2 and 703(a)2 3 make it unlawful for an employer
to fail to undertake reasonable efforts to accommodate the religious
beliefs of an employee. In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison,7'
the Court narrowly construed the religious accommodation obligation. The Court held that Title VII does not require an employer to
attempt to accommodate if it would defeat the seniority expectancies of other employees or obligate an employer to incur more than
de minimis costs. The dissent noted that the decision "deals a fatal
blow to all efforts under Title VII to accommodate work requirements to religious practices."' 5 The Teamster-Evans-Hardisontrilogy has reopened the subject of seniority discrimination under Title
VI. 27 1 The major impact of these cases will fall upon black pre-Act
discriminatees who seek post-Act seniority relief under Title VII.
7 the Court held that the
In General Electric Co. v. Gilbert,2
exclusion of pregnancy-related disabilities from a disability plan is
not unlawful sex discrimination under Title VII. Justice Rehnquist,
who wrote the majority opinion, hinted that a showing of purposeful
discrimination might be required, 278 but then examined plaintiffs
claim in conformity with the Griggs effect test. He found that the
disability plan was lawful because neither sex was protected from a
risk from which the other sex was not protected. This evenhanded
inclusion of risks resulted in a "presumed parity of the benefits ' ' 21,
that could not be destroyed by failure to compensate women for an
additional benefit.
271. See, e.g., Gates v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 492 F.2d 292,294 (9th Cir. 1974); Macklin
v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc., 478 F.2d 979, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
272. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(j) (Supp. V 1975).
273. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970 & Supp. V 1975).

274.

432 U.S. 63 (1977).

275. Id. at 86 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
276. For a discussion of the meaning of a "bona fide" seniority system after Teamsters
and Evans, see Recent Development, 31 VAND. L. REv. 151 (1978).
277. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
278. Id. at 133-36.
279. Id. at 139.
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In September 1977 the Senate passed legislation 80 designed to
overrule Gilbert. Gilbert, however, raised questions beyond the
pregnancy context that may not be covered by the congressional
action. The case raises difficult questions concerning Title VII's
impact on fringe benefit plans. Before Gilbert, many of these plans
did not survive the lower court's application of the liberal Griggs
effect test.2' Although Teamsters established a stringent test for
seniority discrimination cases, the test can be met. Gilbert, however, may completely exempt an entire category of sex discrimination from the strictures of Title VII.
Another sex discrimination case decided during the 1976 term
had mixed results. In Dothard v. Rawlinson0 2 the Court held that
the bona fide occupational qualification exception must be construed very narrowly. This case offered the Court an opportunity to
enunciate the appropriate standard for the application of this limited exception, but it declined to do so. 2 831 The Court found that on
the facts presented this exception was available to exclude females
from contact positions in the Alabama maximum security prison
system. The Court's acceptance in Dothard of the bona fide occupational qualification exception may be of limited importance because
of the unique facts of the case. The Court's reaffirmance of the
Griggs effect test," 4 however, is important because it militates
against the potential frontal attack that lurked in Gilbert.
Much of the law on employment discrimination was ready to
be classified as "black letter" law, but the major Title VII cases
decided by the Supreme Court during the 1976 term place important areas of Title VII law in the same position that it occupied at
the beginning of the first decade of Title VII's enforcement. Consequently, at the beginning of the second decade of enforcement public and private enforcement instrumentalities are again presented
with a unique opportunity. This second decade of enforcement will
test the depth of the sincerity of the national commitment to equal
employment.
The federal government is the nation's largest employer. Overt
discrimination was the accepted practice in federal employment
well into the administration of President Franklin D. Roosevelt. An
official policy against discrimination in federal employment was not
280.
281.
Drewrys,
282.
283.
284.

S. 995, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 123, 123 CONG. Rac. 15,059 (daily ed. Sept. 16, 1977).
See, e.g., Rosen v. Public Serv. Elec. Co., 477 F.2d 90 (3d Cir. 1973); Bartmess v.
U.S.A., Inc., 444 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971).
433 U.S. 321 (1977).
Id. at 333.
Id. at 321.
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announced until the late 1940's.1 5 Although discrimination on the
basis of race, color, or national origin by the federal government is
unconstitutional, presidential executive orders and congressional
legislation only recently have been employed to remedy discrimination at this level. Until 1972 the Civil Service Commission had
almost exclusive responsibility for the enforcement of laws prohibiting discrimination in federal employment. The pattern of enforcement by the Civil Service Commission substantially paralleled the
enforcement records of state FEP commissions. Its enforcement efforts failed to remedy significantly the subtle, pervasive, and institutional forms of employment discrimination."'
With the 1972 amendments to Title VII, Congress extended the
provisions of the Act to federal, state, and local governments., 7
Administrative enforcement over state and local governments was
given to the EEOC, and judicial enforcement was given to the Department of Justice, 288 but administrative enforcement over federal
employment was left with the Civil Service Commission.2 9 For the

first time, however, federal employees were given the right to seek
judicial enforcement to remedy employment discrimination in federal employment after exhaustion of administrative remedies before
the Civil Service Commission. It is now established public policy
that federal employees have the same judicial right to challenge and
correct employment discrimination as do all other employees.
Unlike other enforcement efforts in which there is at least the
potential for joint public and private participation, judicial enforcement of the national policy against employment discrimination in
federal employment tends to rest primarily on the shoulders of private enforcement efforts. In many cases involving private respondents and defendants, state and local governmentg, the Department
of Justice, and private plaintiffs have engaged in some coordinated
efforts; however, in the federal government discrimination cases,
private plaintiffs must face the awesome power and resources of the
federal government because the Department of Justice acts as the
lawyer for the federal defendants.
The first round of litigation in the federal employment litigation suggests that private plaintiffs will again face the issues
spawned in the cases against the private sector. 9 ' The Department
285. 1971 FEDERAL EFFORT, supra note 14, at 19.
286. Id. at 21.
287. 42 U.S.C. § 20O0e-(a) (Supp. V 1975).
288. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. V 1975).
289. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (Supp. V 1975).
290. See Ralston, The Federal Government as Employer: Problems and Issues in Enforcing the Anti-DiscriminationLaws, 10 GA. L. REv. 717 (1976).
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of Justice supported private plaintiffs on these issues during the
first decade of Title VII's enforcement. The next decade of enforcement will present a clear opportunity to test the commitment of the
federal government to the national policy against employment discrimination in the federal employment cases.
The characterization of the EEOC as a "poor, enfeebled
thing"' proved to be a fairly accurate description in 1966. Congress
amended Title VII in 1972 to give the EEOC the authority to seek
judicial enforcement. This amendment provided the EEOC with an
opportunity to substantially improve its effectiveness through a revitalized and proper use of its authority. Until 1977, however, the
EEOC continued to operate under enforcement programs and procedures designed when it had no enforcement authority.' Many of
the organizational and staffing problems that plagued the agency in
its formative years continued to hamper its ability to take appropriate initiative. The EEOC filed only one pattern or practice suit in
1974, the year it obtained exclusive authority under section 707 to
seek judicial enforcement against private employers.293
In 1977 the EEOC initiated major organizational, staffing, and
procedural revisions. 94 These undertakings are an attempt to establish more firmly the EEOC's role as the primary enforcer of the
national policy against employment discrimination. It is too early
to assess the impact of these revisions. Future assessments of the
EEOC's enforcement efforts should consider the following observations. First, the EEOC has stated often that since 1974 a major
reason for its dismal record in using its new enforcement authority
is that institutional lawyers who represent private plaintiffs selected
the most promising cases, leaving the EEOC with cases that develop
the law only marginally. This suggests a certain degree of paranoia
by the EEOC, which no doubt has been generated by widespread
and persistent criticism of its litigation record. Comparing the backlog of cases with the number of cases handled through private enforcement demonstrates that the above explanation is unfounded.' 5
Nevertheless, a number of the policymakers at the EEOC share this
291. SOVERN, supra note 21, at 205.
292. See Peck, The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission:Developments in the
Administrative Process 1965-1975, 51 WASH. L. REv. 831, 848-52, 858-61 (1976).
293. 9 EEOC ANN. REP. 7 (1974).
294. See Statement by Chairman of EEOC Before House Subcomm. on Employment
Opportunities, July 27, 1977, reprintedin Mission, a newsletter published by the EEOC, vol.
5, no. 5, at 3.
295. At the end of fiscal 1973, the EEOC reported that it had filed 116 lawsuits and
estimated that private parties had filed over 800. 8 EEOC ANN. REP. 19 (1973). At this time
the EEOC had a backlog of over 70,000 cases.
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concern. This may explain the new procedural regulations that seem
to be contrary to well-established legal rules, which EEOC once
supported. Second, to reduce the backlog of cases, the EEOC has
adopted a policy to investigate charges narrowly. 25 This new policy
' doctrine adopted
is contrary to the "like and related"2 97
by the
courts. The policy appears to have been adopted in response to
criticism that the EEOC was treating too many charges as class
actions, but this fails to accommodate judicial and congressional
recognition that discrimination is by definition class discrimination.
By issuing a statement disclaiming any intention to preclude the
application of the "like and related" doctrine, the EEOC recognized
the potential negative impact of this new procedure on the private
enforcement effort. 298 On July 20, 1977, the EEOC adopted a resolution establishing a new and more stringent standard to determine
reasonable cause. The new standard requires "a determination that
the claim has sufficient merit to warrant litigation if the matter is
not thereafter conciliated by the Commission or the charging
' The new
party."299
standard obliterates the distinction between the
296. This new system utilizes a positive management approach to the backlog. It
involves grouping files by respondent and selecting those with the largest number of
charges for first review. A special management review team in each district office will
oversee the endeavor ....

After special referral of cases with litigation potential, we

will inquire of every charging party concerning his or her desire to proceed with the case.
Some charges will be closed at this point. We will then contact by phone or visit every
respondent to encourage it to engage in no-fault settlement discussions. If settlement
fails, investigative interrogatories will be sent immediately with mandated follow-up to
conclude the case as quickly as possible.
These cases will be processed under current Commission policies and procedures
except that we will limit the scope of the case to individual matters unless we make a
conscious decision that a systemic approach is required.
Statement of Chairman of EEOC Before the House Subcomm. on Employment Opportunities, July 27, 1977, reprintedin Mission, a newsletter published by the EEOC, vol. 5, no. 5,
at 6.
297. See, e.g., Tipler v. E.I. duPont deNemours & Co., 443 F.2d 125, 131 (6th Cir. 1971);
Sanchez v. Standard Brands, Inc., 431 F.2d 455, 466 (5th Cir. 1970).
298. Notice is hereby given that the decision of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ordinarily to limit investigations of charges of employment discrimination to allegations of violations which directly affect the charging party (see Statement
of Eleanor Holmes Norton, Chair, EEOC, 42 FR 42034) is based on the necessity of
allocating limited Commission resources. Accordingly, the fact of a narrow commission
investigation does not reflect the scope of the Commission investigation which might
reasonably have grown out of a charge. Therefore the decision to limit investigations is
not intended to, and should not, affect the charging party's right to seek relief in a
private suit for all discriminatory practices like or related to those alleged in the charge
which might have been uncovered if the Commission had sufficient resources to investigate all charges more extensively. See McBride v. DeltaAirlines, 551 F.2d 113 (6th Cir.
1977).
42 Fed. Reg. 54,595 (1977).
299. EEOC COMPL. MAN. (CCH) 1014 (1977).

19781

ENFORCEMENT OF TITLE VII

concept of reasonable cause and the judicial standard of preponderance of the evidence. With this new policy many charges that might
have been concluded in the administrative process under a reasonable cause standard are now likely to be dismissed because the investigation fails to disclose evidence sufficient to meet the preponderance of the evidence standard. Narrowly construing charges and
applying the preponderance of the evidence standard will deny
many charging parties access to the only forum available because
of the dearth of lawyers who are willing to represent employment
discrimination claimants. Moreover, these new procedural regulations are likely to generate more, not less, litigation through private
enforcement efforts, placing private plaintiffs and the federal government on opposite sides of the court room.
VI.

CONCLUSION

An assessment of the effort to enforce the national policy
against discrimination that does no more than simply acknowledge
that private enforcement effort has played some role in the campaign to eliminate discrimination in employment is myopic. Much
of the published literature has done no more than that. The important and substantial role of private enforcement in the development
of employment discrimination law can be understood only within a
historical context that must go back at least to 1941. Discrimination
in employment is not a contemporary phenomenon. A threatened
march on Washington in 1941 gave rise to the first national expression of concern about the problem. More than twenty years passed
before a clear national policy against employment discrimination
was expressed in Title VII. The federal machinery in existence at
that time, such as the Department of Justice and the Civil Service
Commission, and the machinery established by Title VII-the
EEOC-for a number of reasons proved unable to establish the
doctrinal foundations necessary for effective implementation of the
national policy. Private enforcement played a critical role in filling
the void created by the absence of effective federal enforcement.
Recent judicial and administrative developments tend to undercut
and limit the vital contribution that the private enforcement efforts
have made to the implementation of the national policy against
discrimination. The federal enforcement programs have yet to demonstrate a capacity to be as effective as their potential. Until that
potential has been realized, private enforcement must be encouraged, supported, and recognized without either deliberate or unintended impediments.

